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Modifying the Kentucky
Rules of EvidenceA Separation of Powers Issue
BY ROBERT G. LAWSON*

INTRODUCTION

ow do you modify laws that simultaneously exist as statutes
and rules of court? For reasons that are described elsewhere
and need not be repeated here, the Kentucky Rules of Evidence ("K.R.E.") came into existence through concurrent enactment by the
General Assembly2 and supreme cour 3 and thus are endowed with all the
attributes of both statutes and rules of court. So, how do you change them
when the inevitable need to do so arises, a question made both interesting
and difficult by the fact that there is no institutional mechanism for
* Dorothy

Salmon Professor of Law, Umversity of Kentucky. B.S. 1960, Berea

College; J.D. 1963, Umversity of Kentucky. One of the two principal drafters of

the Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
1See Robert G. Lawson, Interpretationof the Kentucky Rules ofEvidenceWhat Happened to the Common Law?, 87 KY. L.J. 517, 526-32 (1998-99).
2 See Act

of Apr. 9, 1992, ch. 324, 1992 Ky. Acts.
' See Order, Supreme Court of Kentucky, May 12, 1992.
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concurrent lawmakng by the General Assembly and supreme court, at least
not in Kentucky 4
Drafters of the Rules encountered uncertainty and conflict over where
the authority to create evidence law rests 5 and similar though lesser
uncertainty and conflict over where the authority to amend the Rules
should rest.6 They resolved the former by having the Rules concurrently
4 An

established system for concurrent lawmaking exists in the federal system
for all so-called rules of court (civil, criminal and evidence rules). The United
States Supreme Court formulates rules (or amendments to rules) and transmits them
to Congress for review, whereupon they become effective unless Congress takes
action to reject or modify the transmissions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990); 28
U.S.C. § 2074 (1988).
5Uncertainty and conflict over this issue has long been a major problem for law
reformers. Serious conversations about adoption of evidence rules for the federal
courts began m the 1930s, as part of the effort that produced the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Ronan Degnan, The Law ofFederalEvidence Reform, 76
HARV L. REV 275 (1962). Conflict over whether rulemaking m thins area is a

legislative or judicial function stifled these early efforts and suppressed evidence
law reform for more than three decades. Renewed efforts in the 1960s produced a
set of proposed evidence rules for federal courts but no end to the uncertainty over
whether the authority to act rested with the legislature or the judiciary. The
Supreme Court adopted the proposals as rules of court and submitted them to
Congress as required by its statutory rulemaking authority, expecting Congress to
approve through inaction as it had done routinely with other exercises of this
authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990). Instead, Congress rejected the Court's
submission. See Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 8 Stat. 9 (1973). It
subjected the proposals to full legislative review, enacted them into law, and
produced an evidence code that exists as statutes of Congress rather than as rules
of court. See H.R. CoNF REP. No. 93-1597 at 1 (1974), reprnted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7098. Uncertainty and conflict overthe authority issue has also
slowed and hampered reform efforts at the state level. See, e.g., Paul C. Gianelli,
The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The GeneralAssembly, Evidence, and
Rulemaking, 29 CASE W RES. L. REV 16 (1978).
6 At the core of tis uncertainty and conflict was concern by the Kentucky
Supreme Court about legislative infringement upon its constitutional rulemaking
power, the source ofwhich was an ongmalproposal that left the General Assembly
with statutory authority to disapprove of amendments or additions to the Rules
prescribed by the court. See EVIDENCE RULES STUDY COMM., KENTUCKY RULES
OF EViDENCE 115 (Final Draft 1989) [hereinafter STUDY COMM.]. Justice Charles
Leibson took the lead in expressing the court's position: "I am concerned about
requiring the Supreme Court to get legislative approval for amending, changing or
modifying the rules." Letter from Charles Leibson, Supreme Court Justice, to
Robert G. Lawson (Dec. 14, 1990) (on file with author). The court subsequently
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enacted and the latter by incorporating into the Rules a very complex
amendment provision:
(a) Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Kentucky shall have the
power to prescribe amendments or additions to the Kentucky Rules of
Evidence. Amendments or additions shall not take effect until they have
been reported to the Kentucky General Assembly by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court at or after the beginning of a regular session of the
General Assembly but not later than the first day of March, and until the
adjournment of that regular session of the General Assembly; but if the
General Assembly within that time shall by resolution disapprove any
amendment or addition so reported it shall not take effect. The effective
date of any amendment or addition so reported may be deferred by the
General Assembly to a later date or until approved by the General
Assembly. However, the General Assembly may not disapprove any
amendment or addition or defer the effective date of any amendment or
addition that constitutes rules ofpractice andprocedure under Section 116
of the Kentucky Constitution.
(b) General Assembly. The General Assembly may amend any
proposal reportedby the Supreme Court pursuant to subdivision (a) ofthis
rule and may adopt amendments or additions to the Kentucky Rules of
Evidence not reported to the General Assembly by the Supreme Court.
However, the General Assembly may not amend any proposals reported
by the Supreme Court and may not adopt amendments or additions to the
Kentucky Rules of Evidence that constitute rules of practice and
procedure under Section 116 of the Constitution of Kentucky.
(c) Review of Proposals for Change. Neither the Supreme Court nor
the General Assembly should undertake to amend or add to the Kentucky
Rules of Evidence without first obtaining a review of proposed amendments or additions from the Evidence Rules Review Commission
described m Rule 1103. 7

proposed changes m the amendment provisions of the Rules. See Letter from
Robert F Stephens, Chief Justice, to Robert G. Lawson (Sept. 6, 1999) (on file
with author). Drafters of the Rules suggested different modifications of the original
proposals, expressing an opinion that the court's proposals would not provide "a
workable approach to amending the rules" and assuring the court that its authority
over practice and procedure would "remain fully intact." Letter from Robert G.
Lawson to Robert F Stephens, Chief Justice (Dec. 4, 1991) (on file with author).
The court concurred with the new proposals of the Study Committee, and the
amendment provisions of the Rules took their final form. See Letter from Robert
F Stephens, Chief Justice, to Robert G. Lawson (Dec. 17, 1991) (on file with
author).
7KY. R. EVID. [hereinafter K.R.E.] 1102.
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This provision-Rule 1102-may appear at first glance to embrace for
amendment purposes the approach that was used to enact the Rules, i.e.,
concurrence in modifications of the Rules by both the supreme court and
General Assembly, and it does in fact replicate aspects of the enactment
approach. It is in truth a more complex provision than it appears to be,
mostly because of complications generated by the constitutional separation
of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of government.
Major problems involving amendment of the Rules have not yet
surfaced. There has been no substantial modification of the Rules since
their enactment, although some is needed, and no resolution of fundamental
questions concerning amendment by the supreme court. There have been
some peripheral observations in the case law about the amendment
provisions of the Rules but no major consideration of the important
ramifications of Rule 1102, although crucial issues concerning amendment
loom large on the horizon.' It is the purpose of this Article to identify and
discuss these issues and shed some needed light on the amendment
provisions of the Rules, all with an eye on the fundamental question of
whether the creation of evidence law is a legislative orjudicial function.
Part I sets the stage for subsequent discussion by describing the basics
of amendment under Rule 1102, what the Kentucky Supreme Court has
said on the subject to date, and the issues that need attention and analysis.
Part II examines the fundamentals of judicial rulemaking generally and
under Kentucky law Part HI discusses the meaning of "substance" and
"procedure," concepts that are used in Kentucky and elsewhere to define
the rulemaking authority ofthejudiciary, with special attention given to the
Federal Rules Enabling Act-the richest source of guidance on the
subject-and to the commentary of legal scholars on general rulemaking
authorities. Part IV extends the substance/procedure analysis to evidence
law and attempts a classification of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence as
"substance" and "procedure" for rulemaking (and amendment) purposes.
I. SETTING THE STAGE
A. Rule 1102
In examining the content of Rule 1102, it helps to know that the
drafters of Kentucky's Rules looked favorably upon the approach that
'See, e.g., Stnngerv. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883 (Ky 1997); Mullins v.
Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1997); Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955
S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1997).
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had been used effectively for two decades to amend the Federal Rules.'
Under the federal approach, amendments are formulated by the Supreme
Court, transmitted to Congress for review, and rendered effective on a
fixed date unless Congress takes action to reject or alter the subrmissions. 1° It also helps to be reminded that drafters of Kentucky's Rules
would have known that the supreme court is far more likely than the
General Assembly to discover flaws in evidence rules and considerably
more capable of formulating modifications to fix those flaws, conclusions reinforced by the federal system's approach to the amendment
process."
With these things m mind, it is easy to see that the approach adopted
by Rule 1102 has four principal components: (1) a plenary power in the
supreme court to prescribe amendments or additions to the Rules," (2) an
obligation on the court to report its actions to the General Assembly, 3 (3)
limited General Assembly authority to disapprove ormodify supreme court
actions or to prescribe its own amendments or additions, and (4) strong
encouragement for both rulemakmg bodies to rely upon the Evidence Rules
Review Commission before finalizing changes in the Rules. 4
The supreme court clearly occupies the dominant position with respect
to amendment of the Rules. It has the power to prescribe amendments and
additions without restriction, and it has the ability to control and influence

'See Letter from Robert G. Lawson to Robert F Stephens, Chief Justice (Sept.
16, 1991)
(on file with author).
'0 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074.
"Most modem authorities concede that Congress has the constitutional power
to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for federal courts. See, e.g., Edward W
Cleary, PreliminaryNotes on Reading theRules ofEvidence, 57 NEB. L. REV 908,
910 (1978). Congress's delegation of this power to the Supreme Court reflects the
clearest possible recognition of the superior ability of the judiciary to deal with
matters of practice and procedure, including the law of evidence.
1 Thus power is plenary in the sense that it requires no consideration of the
distinction between 'procedure" and "substance" that is brought into play by the
Rule's use of Section 116 of the Constitution to define the roles of the supreme
court and General Assembly in amendment of the Rules.
" As under the federal model, amendments prescribed by the court do not
become effective until they have been reported to the General Assembly under the
terms of Rule 1102 and until the General Assembly adjourns the session in winch
such report is received.
" The Evidence Rules Review Commission is a purely advisory body that is
designed to function like the advisory committees on rules of procedure in the
federal system.
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the Evidence Rules Review Commission.' 5 Its unrestricted power to
prescribe modifications to the Rules is grounded partly in its constitutional
authority to adopt "rules of. practice and procedure for the Court of
Justice"' 6 and partly in a delegation of authority from the General
Assembly somewhat similar to Congress's delegation of authority to the
United States Supreme Court under the federal Rules Enabling Act.7 While
delegating this authority to the court, Rule 1102 leaves the General
Assembly with authority to act independently to define and/or redefine
rules of evidence that fall on the "substance" side of the constitutional
dichotomy between "substance" and "procedure." In its use of this
dichotomy to define the General Assembly's amendment authority, the
provision says nothing about where "procedure" ends and "substance"
begins in the law of evidence, choosing instead to leave this issue for caseby-case determinations as the need arises. That this need will arise sooner
rather than later is guaranteed, for the General Assembly has already acted
on its own to modify certain provisions of the Rules, as described below
B. The Court's View
The supreme court has expressed some views on the meaning of Rule
1102 but has stopped far short of rendering landmark decisions on
amendment of the Rules. Its first significant consideration of the provision
occurred in Weaver v. Commonwealth, 8 one of two cases in which the
court encountered situations supporting arguments that the Rules had been
unilaterally amended by an exercise ofjudicial power. In trying to defend
against drug charges, the defendant in Weaver was hampered by lower
court application of a privilege that had been judicially created after
adoption of the Evidence Rules.' The supreme court struck the privilege
" The membership of the Commission is the chiefjustice, one additional judge,
the chairs of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, and five members of the
bar. The cluef justice appoints six of the eight members (all but the legislative
representatives) and has sole authority to call the body into session. See K.R.E.
1103.
16Ky.CONST. § 116.
" See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990) (the Rules Enabling Act); infraPart I.In this
delegation of authority, Congress distinguished between "procedure" and
"substance" and limited the rulemaking authority of the Supreme Court to matters
of procedure.
isWeaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1997).
9 The defendant was precluded from engaging in certain cross-examination of
a police officer about an maudible tape recording of the drug transaction that
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down as improperly created" and m its opiinon made the following
statement about amendment of the Rules:
The proper procedure for amending or adding to the Kentucky Rules of
Evidence is established m KRE 1102 and 1103. These proceduresdo not
include amendments or additions created unilaterally by either the
GeneralAssembly or the Supreme Court. More specifically, the rules

do not permit the amendment or addition of any new rules of evidence by
any court of this Commonwealth except the Supreme Court. 21
In fis initial impression of the amendment process, the court sees that
portion of Rule 1102 that facilitates a cooperative/concurrent amendment
of the Rules-initiated by the supreme court, transmitted to the General
Assembly for review, and approved through action or inaction of the
General Assembly It appears not to see aspects of the Rule that were
designed to account for the likelihood, if not certainty, that the two
lawmaking bodies would sooner or later act independently of each other in
the creation of evidence doctrine, for it goes too far in suggesting that Rule
1102 leaves no room for unilateral amendment of the Rules. 2
A second case m which the amendment provisions of the Rules came
under scrutiny was Stringer v. Commonwealth,' a case m wluch the
resulted m his indictment. "The trial judge sustained the objection to this inquiry
on the basis ofthe so-called 'police surveillance privilege' recogized by the Court
of Appeals in Jett v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

Prior to Jett, the surveillance privilege had never been recognized by our courts;
nor is it found in Article V of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence." Weaver, 955
S.W.2d at 727
20 "If a 'police surveillance privilege'
is to be adopted in this Commonwealth,
it must be adopted m accordance with the procedures established m KRE 1102 and
1103." Weaver, 955 S.W.2d at 727
1
1d.
I (emphasis added).
2 Subsection (b) of Rule 1102 clearly authorizes the General Assembly to act
on its own to adopt amendments or additions to the Rules, provided that it may not
so act with respect to parts of the Rules that constitutes '"practice and procedure"
under Section 116 of the Constitution. Subsection (a) of the provision authorizes
the supreme court to prescribe amendments or additions to the Rules and fixes a
process by which it must act to do so (submission to the General Assembly, etc.).
The Rule says nothing one way or another concerning the power of the supreme
court to create evidence law outside the confines ofthe Rules, a complex issue that
the author has addressed m an earlier article on the Rules. See Lawson, supranote
1, at 567-75.
2 Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883 (Ky. 1997).
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supreme court had to decide if an expert witness can express an opinion on
an ultimate fact.24 The following circumstances weighed heavily in the
consideration of the issue and provided the fodder for controversy over
amendment of the Rules:
Before the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, Kentucky's common law
included a general prohibition against expert opimon on the ultimate facts
of a case. Drafters of the Rules recommended abandoning this prohibition
in favor of the language found in Federal Rule 704, which provides that
expert testimony "is not objectional because it embraces an ultimate issue
to be decided by the trier of fact." The recommendation was enacted by
the General Assembly in 1990, but was deleted from the Rules before
their final approval in 1992, clearly because ofresistance by the supreme
court. As enacted, the Rules were simply silent with respect to expert
opinion on ultimate facts.25
The court abandoned the position that had prevailed both before and
after the enactment of the Rules and held that experts may testify to
opinions on ultimate facts, believing that this modification of the law could
occur without offense to the amendment provisions of the Rules.26 Two
justices disagreed and strongly protested, arguing that under the guise of
interpretation the majority had ignored and violated the requirement that
amendments occur underjoint action ofthe General Assembly and supreme
court. "Sadly, and despite its protest to the contrary, the majority in this
case has amended the Rules of Evidence by adoption of Rule 704, contrary
to the express provisions of KRE 1102 and 1103. ' 27
Not much can be made about amendment from the Stnnger holding
since the majority said that it reached its decision by construing existing
provisions of the Rules.28 The dissenters adhere to the Weaver view that the
Specifically, the court had to decide in a child sexual abuse case if it was
proper for a physician who had examined the child to testify that the physical
findings of the examination were consistent with the events alleged by the child.
2
Lawson, supra note 1, at 519-20.
26 "Our
departure from the 'ultimate issue' rule does not contravene KRE 1102
and 1103." Stringer,956 S.W.2d at 891.
27 Id. at 896 (Lambert, J., concurring). See also id. at 897 (Stumbo, J.,
dissenting) ("In directviolationofKRE 1102, the majority's opinion does precisely
what this Court refused to do when we rejected proposed KRE 704.").
28 "Our failure to adopt proposed KRE 704 simply left the 'ultimate issue'
unaddressed in the Kentucky Rules of Evidence and, therefore, subject to common
law interpretation by proper application of the rules pertaining to relevancy, KRE
24
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Rules do not permit unilateral amendments and, more importantly, imply
that the supreme court retains no authority to create evidence law outside
the confines of the Rules, i.e., through decision making rather than formal
amendment of the Rules. Rule 1102 contains some language suggesting
that judicial expansion of evidence law must occur under the Rules29 but
clearly contains no explicit support of the dissenters' position. Commentators have vehemently disagreed over whether courts retain a common law
power to create evidence law after the adoption of comprehensive evidence
rules.3" The controversy in Stringer leaves no doubt that amendment
questions under Rule 1102 are related to the more fundamental issue of
whether a common law power to create evidence doctrine survived
adoption of the Rules.
The most interesting decision rendered so far on the amendment
provisions of the Rules is Mullins v. Commonwealth.31 The defendant in
this case was convicted of child sexual abuse after testimony by his wife
was admitted into evidence over his objection under the spousal privilege
provision of the Evidence Rules. The trial court ruled the evidence
admissible by finding waiver of the spousal privilege, but the important
ruling was a holding by the Kentucky Court of Appeals that a statute
declaring the spousal privilege inapplicable in prosecutions for child abuse
prevailed over the spousal privilege provision of the Evidence Rules.32
Upon discretionary review in the supreme court, the defendant argued that
this statute, as interpreted by the court of appeals, violated both the
401, and expert testimony, KRE 702." Id. at 891-92.
29 In subsection (a), the provision authorizes the supreme court to prescribe
amendments or additions to the Rules, perhaps thereby suggesting that judicial
expansion of evidence law must occur through amendment of the Rules.
30 Some argue that the Rules preempt the field m order to achieve "a truly
codified body of Evidence Law." Edward J.Imwmkelned, A BriefDefense of the
Supreme Court'sApproach to the Interpretationofthe FederalRulesofEvidence,
27 IND.L. REv 267, 293 (1993). Others counter that the adoption of Rules does
not eliminate the need for growth in the law through "the development of novel
evidentiary doctrines
preserved m case law precedent." Glen Weissenberger,
Are31the FederalRules ofEvidence a Statute?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 398 (1994).
Mullins v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1997).
32 The statute in question provides that the husband/wife privilege may not be
used "for excluding evidence regarding a dependent, neglected, or abused child."
KY. REV STAT. ANN. [hereinafter KR.S.] § 620.050(2) (Michie 1996). The
privileges provision of the Evidence Rules, K.R.E. 504, gives a party the right "to
prevent hIs or her spouse from testifying against the party as to events occurrmng
after the date of their mamage."
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amendment provision of the Evidence Rules (Rule 1102) and the constitutional rulemaking power of the supreme court (Section 116).13
The defendant's argument under Rule 1102 was problematical to say
the least. The statute in question had been enacted in 1986, four years
before the adoption of the Evidence Rules and Rule 1102.1' The defendant
apparently tried to skirt around this crucial fact by arguing that the appeals
court's mere use of the statute served in some sort of mysterious manner
to amend the privilege provision of the Rules in violation of the terms of
Rule 1102. The supreme court disagreed, sustained the validity of the
challenged statute, and affirmed the conviction:
Here, this Court and the Court of Appeals are interpreting the application
of a statute of the General Assembly. The Court of Appeals properly
interpreted a statute that was enacted for a separate and distinct purpose
from KRE 504. We find no constitutional or procedural fault with the
legislation. The interpretation of the statute by a Court does not revise
KRE 504 in any way. There is no violation of the amendmentprocedure
provided by KRE 1102.15
The court made almost nothing of the fact that the statute predated the
adoption of the Rules. It did say that "[t]he statute is not an amendment or
addition to the rules of evidence" 3 6 but never once indicated that this was
because the statute was in existence when the Rules were adopted.37 By
slighting this crucial fact, the court gave the defendant's Rule 1102
argument more credence than it deserved and the amendment provision of
the Rules more attention than it needed. It could have resolved this first
argument by simply noting that a statute cannot possibly amend a privilege
rule not in existence at the time of the statute's enactment.
What makes Mullins interesting, and potentially very important as an
amendment case, is what the court said and implied about the separation of
governmental powers and judicial rulemaking. After disposing of the
defendant's unusual argument under Rule 1102, the court turned its
attention to the defendant's more substantial argument that the statute

33 See
Mullins, 956 S.W.2d at 211.
34See
Act of Apr. 10, 1986, ch. 423,
35Mullins,
956 S.W.2d at 211-12.
36

1986 Ky. Acts 66.

1d.at 211.

31 In fact,

one can carefully read the opinon m Mullins without ever realizing
that the statute under consideration had been enacted well before the Evidence
Rules came into existence.
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under consideration had been enacted in violation of the constitutional
rulemaking authority of the court. In describing tis argument as unconvincing, the court acknowledged that its rulemaking authority m the
evidence area is sometimes subordinate to the lawmaking authority of the
General Assembly- "The General Assembly may legislate m order to
protect children, and it may determine that children's rights are paramount
when there is a conflict with the privilege of an adult to exclude evidence
regarding the abuse, dependency or neglect of a child."3' Its concession is
acknowledgment that parts of the law of evidence constitute "substance"
rather than "practice and procedure," for no such concession could be made
if the General Assembly's action had intruded upon the court's exclusive
constitutional authority over practice and procedure. It is in this regard that
Mullins could be an important case, for the same concession and same
constitutional separation of powers is used in Rule 1102 to define the
independent authority of the General Assembly to modify the Evidence
Rules, although the supreme court has yet to recognize the existence of that
independent authority
More is unsettled than settled about the supreme court's views on
amendment of the Rules. Important questions have emerged from its
peripheral considerations of Rule 1102, but the court has yet to engage in
a careful analysis of the particulars of that provision. Its best opportunity
to do so surfaced in Mullins but was properly deferred when it became
clear that the legislation in that case did not qualify as "an amendment or
addition to the rules of evidence." 39 Renewed opportunity of like kind is
merely a matter of time, for the General Assembly has now unmistakably
and repeatedly acted on its own to amend the Evidence Rules, as described
in the next part of the discussion.
C. Legislative Amendments
The General Assembly had acted on its own to create evidence doctrine
by the time Weaver arrived in the supreme court. The court noted these
developments in its opinion and perhaps fired a subtle shot across the bow
of the General Assembly,4 although like the legislation inMullins,this too
38

Mullins, 956 S.W.2d at 212.
Id. at 211.
S"These procedures [from K.R.E. 1102 and 1103] do not include amendments
or additions created unilaterally by either the General Assembly or the Supreme
Court (although we are awarethat the General Assembly has enacted post-1992
statutes which purport to create new privileges, e.g., KRS 325.431, KRS
39
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operated only coincidentally to modify the Rules of Evidence.4" More
recently, the General Assembly has aimed its actions directly at the Rules,
eliminating all doubt that it has enacted amendments or additions without
the concurrence of the supreme court.
It would be an understatement to say that the General Assembly has
totally overhauled the counselor-client privilege contained in Rule 506. As
originally enacted, this privilege was narrowly drawn and carefully defined,
reflecting a judgment by its drafters "that a sweeping counseling privilege
could result m the suppression of credible relevant evidence in many
cases."'42 Its protection covered only four kinds of counselors--school,
sexual assault, drug abuse, and alcohol abuse, all of which had been
formalized by recognition in the Kentucky Revised Statutes. As it now
exists, the privilege is essentially what the Rules' drafters feared and tried
to avoid-a sweeping counseling privilege that is neither narrowly drawn
nor carefully defined.43
The General Assembly has kept the privilege intact for those counselors
who were covered by the original provision. 4 It has extended protection to
professional art therapists,4 5 professional marriage and family therapists,"
224.01.040)." Weaver, 955 S.W.2d at 727 (emphasis added).
41 The court cited K.R.S. § 325.431, which creates an evidentiary privilege for
proceedings of an accountancy quality review committee, and K.R.S. § 224.01040, which creates an evidentiary privilege for environmental audit reports.
42 STUDY COMM., supra note 6, at 47
43 See K.R.E. 506.
" School and sexual assault counselors continue to be covered explicitly as
before. Drug and alcohol abuse counselors are not explicitly covered in the current
provision but clearly fall within new and additional categories brought under the
protection of the privilege. See id.
4'The Rule attempts to define art therapist by incorporation of statutes dealing
with that subject. The problem is that the incorporated statutes define the person as
one who is educated in art therapy and obtains board certification as such. See
K.R.S. § 309.130(2). There is a subehapter on the subject but no indication in any
of its provisions of the kind of counseling activities done by art therapists. See 1d.
§§ 309.130-.138.
'The Kentucky Revised Statutes define this type oftherapist as "a person who
has completed a master's or doctoral degree program in marriage and family
therapy, or an equivalent course of study, from an accredited educational institution
and who is certified by the board [Board of Certification of Marriage and Family
Therapists]." Id. § 335.300(2). Although perhaps easier to define than the art
therapy privilege, the privilege for marriage and family therapy is substantially
more womsome because of the high likelihood that it will mpair access to needed
evidence in a variety of situations.
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victims advocates,47 and others. More significantly, it has extended the
protection of the privilege to any and all persons who obtain certification as
"professional counselors," without restriction as to the nature or subject
matter of their counseling activities.1 9 Most recently, the privilege was
extended to confidential commumcations to persons engaged m "fee-based
pastoral counseling,"50 an amendment that could easily cause one to wonder
what has happened to the "fundamental principle that 'the public
has a
right to every man's evidence."' 5 1
The General Assembly has also acted on its own to modify the
psychotherapist-patient privilege of Rule 507 It has expanded the
circumstances under which the privilege can be claimed by climcal social
workers.52 More significantly, it has expanded the privilege to include

"' A "victim advocate" is someone who works (or volunteers) for a public or
private agency, organization, or official in counseling and assisting certain types
ofcrime victims. See id. §§ 421.570 and 421.500. Drafters of the original provision
concluded that the privilege should be limited to persons counseling sexual assault
m a rape crisis center. The amended provision is much, much broader in its
coverage and is thus much more likely to come into conflict with demands for
relevant evidence in the trial of important cases.
41 The amended privilege specifically covers persons who provide "crisis
response services as a member of the community crisis response team." K.R.E.
506(a)(1)(F). There is a statutory subchapter on community crisis response efforts
but nothing in its provisions to suggest what types of counseling nght be covered
by the privilege. See K.R.S. §§ 36.250-.270.
4'A professional counselor is "a person who has completed a master's or
doctoral degree m counseling from an accredited educational institution, and is
certified by the [Kentucky Board of Certification for Professional Counselors]."
K.R.S. § 335.500(2).
50In the legislation creating this privilege, the General Assembly recognized for
the first time a group called "fee-based pastoral counselors" and created a
certification board carrying the same name, a pattern fitting most of the earlier
amendments. See id. §§ 335.600-.699. It defines the counseling as "integrating
spiritual resources with insights from the behavioral sciences, in exchange for a fee
or other compensation." Id. § 335.605(3). The General Assembly said that its
purpose was to protect the public safety and welfare by providing for regulation of
such counselors. See id. § 335.600. How giving them a privilege against testifying
in court furthers this purpose is not obvious.
51Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 48, 50 (1980) (quoting United States v
Bryan,
339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
52 The
original provision included clinical social workers m its definition of
"psychotherapisf' but only if they were: (1) licensed and (2) certified for the
independent practice ofclimcal socialwork. See Act ofApr. 9, 1992, ch. 324, § 12,
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within its protection nurses and nurse practitioners who practice psychiatric
or mental health nursing, 3 an expansion that appears like most of the others
to have been adopted without much concern for potential loss of relevant
evidence.
The General Assembly has not yet moved beyond the privileges area
in acting on its own to amend the Rules. It has historically had a much
broader interest in evidence rules' and little concern about the possibility
of intruding upon constitutionally protected territory of the supreme court.
Thus, it is only a matter of time until it moves against other provisions of
the Rules and/or expands evidence doctrine through additional legislative
actions outside the Rules. If not yet done, it will push to the outer limits of
its authority and force the court to resolve the question of what it can and
cannot do on its own to amend the Rules.
D. Conclusion
There is no doubt that Rule 1102 leaves the General Assembly with
limited authority to act on its own to amend the Rules (and to disapprove
amendments made by the supreme court).51 It defines this authority much
like the Tenth Amendment defines the authority of states ("powers not
delegated to the United States
are reserved to the States"),56 by
reserving to the General Assembly what is left over from the constitutional
delegation to the supreme court of the authority to adopt rules of "practice
and procedure" for Kentucky's courts. Consequently, one can determine
the reach of the reserved authority only by determining the reach of the

1992 Ky. Acts. The amended provision includes clinical social workers who are
licensed, an amendment that expands a privilege whose justification is marginal at
best. See K.R.E. 507
53 See K.R.E. 507(a)(2)(D).
These interests are revealed by the statutes that existed before the adoption
of the Rules. See Act of Mar. 19, 1990, ch. 88, §§ 77-91, 1990 Ky. Acts. Among
laws that had to be repealed or modified were statutes on "dead men," former
testimony, order of testimony at trial, judicial notice, competency of witnesses,
prior acts of rape victims, business and public records, and others that are now
covered in provisions of the Rules.
55 The supreme court has not embraced this view of the provision
but it has not
reviewed a single case in which careful analysis of the language of Rule 1102 was
crucial to its decision. The language of the Rule is clear m tis regard and the
supreme court will easily recognize that when the question is more specifically
framed
for its consideration.
56
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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delegated authority, avery difficult task that is the primary objective of this
Article and that begins with some consideration of the fundamental aspects
ofjudicial rulemaking.
]1. JUDICIAL RULEMAKING

A. History
One finds in English history a custom or tradition of judicial rulemaking, but not one that excluded Parliament from the arena.57 The United
States Constitution was adopted without a provision onjudicial rulemaking
but the Supreme Court "at an early date by rule of court considered that
it had the power to regulate its own procedure.""8 Its position was later
defended by Roscoe Pound and other legal heavyweights: "Hence, if
anything was received from England as a part of our institutions, it was that
the making of these general rules of practice was a judicial function.
Indeed, this was well understood in the beginning of American law "5 9
Without constitutional recognition, it was argued, rulemakmg "is so
judicial in essence that its grant must be inplied from the very grant of 'the
judicial Power' to the Court."' Early legislators may have disagreed, for
the very first Congress saw fit to announce legislatively that the federal
courts would have the power to make "rules for the orderly conducting [of]
6
business in the said courts." '
Judicial rulemaking, whatever its source, dominated the scene for most
of our country's first century, although state and federal courts alike relied

" "The history of English practice thus reveals a pattern of shared judiciallegislative regulation of practice and procedure. Under this pattern, the primary
rulemaking initiative rested with the judiciary, subject to the superior general
power of Parliament to control procedure as it saw fit." Ralph U. Whitten,
Separation of Powers Restrictions on Judicial Rulemalang: A Case Study of
FederalRule4, 40 ME. L. REV 41,49 (1988); see also Roscoe Pound, The RuleMakingPowerofthe Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926); Charles Anthony Riedl, To
What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-malang Power PrescribeRules of
Evidence?, 26 A.B.A. J. 601 (1940).
58 Riedl, supranote 57, at 601.
'9 Pound, supra note 57, at 601. See also John H. Wigmore, All Legislative
Rules for the Judiciary are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REv 276 (1928),
repnnted in 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 159 (1936), as Legislature Has No
Powerin ProceduralField.
o Comment, Rules of Evidence and the Federal Practice: Limits on the
Supreme Court'sRulemaking Power, 1974 ARiz. ST. L.J. 77, 82.
61Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17(b), 1 Stat. 73.
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heavily on the English system for their rules of practice and procedure. The
courts-created system was earmarked by common law writs, forms of
actions, fact pleadings, and separate courts of law and equity, a system that
was soundly criticized as "cumbrous, dilatory, expensive, [and] ultraformal."'62 Judges and lawyers resisted change, even after shortcomings
became apparent,63 and the early rulemaking authority of the judiciary was
spanngly exercised in pursuit of procedural reform, an almost irresistible
invitation to aggressive legislative intervention.
The New York legislature acted in 1848 to reform an outdated
procedural system, enacted the famous Field Code, and initiated an era of
procedural reform dominated by legislative enactments rather than rules of
court. A majority of states enacted procedure codes within three decades'
and the legislative branch had clearly gained prominence over court
procedures by the end of the century Some viewed the movement as
"revolutionary 65 while others credited it for abolishing an obsolete and
inefficient adjudicatory system; 66 it has been viewed as both an abdication
of power by courts and a usurpation of power by legislatures67 but always
as one of the most prominent legal events of the nineteenth century Pound
used the word "misfortune" to describe the court's relinquishment of
control over its procedures. 6 He insisted that "procedure
belongs to the
6
9
courts rather than to the legislature," but conceded that it would be
difficult "to pronounce such legislative interference
to be unconstitutional."70
In the early part of the twentieth century, as enthusiasm for code
procedures waned and demands for additional reforms surfaced, debate was
62 Pound, supra note

57, at 599.
Charles W Grau, Who Rules the Courts?- The Issue ofAccess to the
RulemalangProcess, 62 JUDICATURE 428 (1979). See also Pound, supra note 57,
at 599-600.
4 See Riedl, supra note 57, at 601.
65Maynard
E. Pirsig & Randall M. Tietien, CourtProcedureand the Separation ofPowers in Minnesota, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REv 141, 149 (1989).
' "It was
the state legislatures, not the courts, that abolished the 'awkward
and cumbersome common law pleadings."' Grau, supra note 63, at 429.
67 "Rule by legislation resulted either because the courts abdicated whatever
power they had to promulgate their own rules or because the legislative branch
usurped the power regardless of the court's attitude in the matter." Riedl, supra
note 57, at 601.
6 See Pound, supranote 57, at 601.
63 See

69Id.
70 Id.
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reignited over whether rulemaking for the courts should rest with the
judiciary or the legislature. Pound argued that "[t]he legislature ought to
leave judicial procedure to the judiciary,"'" and Wigmore wrote that
legislative regulation of court procedures crossed the constitutional divide
and encroached upon the province of the judiciary 72 Not everyone agreed
and an intense battle for control over procedures ensued, most prominently
when efforts were made to reform the practice and procedure of federal
courts. 3 The end results were the federal Rules Enabling Act, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the beginning of the modem era of judicial
rulemaking, all of which are reserved for subsequent discussion in this
Section.
B. Pros and Cons
Debate has been raging for nearly a century over whether court rules
should be made by courts or legislatures, without a clear-cut resolution.
The strongest argument forjudicial rulemaking is that courts are better than
legislators at making rules of practice and procedure. Judges are educated
in the intricacies of the subject and are positioned to observe injustices that
might be attributable to flawed procedures. There is no room to doubt that
the advantage in expertise rests with the judiciary- "Court rules
are the
work of an agency whose whole business is court business
an agency
keenly aware of the latest problems and fully capable of bringing to bear
in their early solution a long and solid expenence." 74 Some argue that court
business is adjudication not rulemaking, that the latter differs from the
former in both process and inpact, and that even in the hands of judges
"mlemakmg is a legislative process.""5 Hardly anyone would counter that
courts are as good at rulemaking as they are at adjudication, especially
when it comes to "drastic wholesale procedural reform." 76 But, once we
remember that rulemaking mostly involves "minor alterations of single
71

Id.at 601-02.

72 See

Wigmore, supra note 59, at 276.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of.1934, 130 U. PA.
L. REV 1015 (1982); Charles E. Clark, The Influence of FederalProcedural
Reform, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 144, 145-48 (1948).
7 Leo Levm & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial
Rule-Making: A Problem of ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV 1, 11
(1958).
7 Grau, supranote 63, at 428.
76 Levin & Amsterdam, supranote 74, at 11.
73 See, e.g.,
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rules from time to time as experience dictates,"" there is again little room
to doubt that courts are better equipped than legislatures to fix the
problems.
It is also argued that courts are more likely to be interested in fixing the
problems than legislatures. What Pound said on tus subject more than
seventy-five years ago probably rings even truer todayLegislatures today are so busy, the pressure of work is so heavy, the
demands of legislation in matters of state finance, of economic and social
legislation, and of provision for the needs of a new urban and industrial
society are so multifarious, that it is idle to expect legislatures to take a
real interest m anything so remote from newspaper interest, so technical,
and so recondite as legal procedure.78
History clearly supports the complaint that in dealing with matters of
practice and procedure "legislatures are intolerably slow to act and cause
even the slightest and most obviously necessary matter of procedural
change to be long delayed."79 And since it almost always rests at the end of
the legislative agenda, rulemaking legislation is notably vulnerable to what
Pound called "the ax-grinding desires of particular law-makers." 0 The
combination of lesser interest and political influences are likely to produce
"ill-considered practice provisions"'" that have no better than a fair chance
of serving the greater interests ofjudicial institutions.8 2
77 id.

" Pound, supra note 57, at 602.
7'Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 10. See also Charles W Joiner &
Oscar J.Miller, Rules ofPracticeandProcedure:A Study ofJudicialRuleMalang,
55 MICH. L. REv 623, 643 (1957); Benjamin Kaplan & Warren J. Greene, The
Legislature'sRelation to JudicialRule-Makng: An Appraisal of Winberry v.
Salisbury, 65 HARv L. REv 234,252 (1951).
" Pound,supra note 57, at 602. See also Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and
"Procedure" in the Rules EnablingAct, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 302 (stating that
"[Judges] can be expected to be energetic in serving the longer-term interests of
judicial institutions, and insensitive to the political influences that impede
legislators' efforts to devise effective procedure").
81 Joiner & Miller, supra note 79, at 643.
2 0ne could easily conclude that some, ifnot most,
of the previously described
amendments to Kentucky's Evidence Rules are illustrative of ill-considered
practice provisions that serve the political interests of small groups at a
considerable cost to the long-term interests of the adjudicatory system. It is hard to
find any other explanation for the creation ofa special evidentiary privilege for fee-
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What is the hangup with judicial rulemaking if courts are more expert
in the subject, have greater interest in the problems, and are more insulated

from political influences? It has been said that courts should not be
permitted to make rules they will have to later interpret.83 It has also been
said that courts are likely to impinge upon substantive rights in exercising
rulemaking powers, "not because judges would make rules governing
substantive law as such, but rather because procedure and substance are
inextricably interwoven."" More convincingly, it has been said that courts
have shown that they cannot be trusted to exercise rulemaking authority
when the need arises: "[I]t is worth recalling that the monuments of
procedural reform of the nineteenth century were legislative.
[T]he
courts, given a power to make rules, did not live up to their corresponding
responsibility " 5 Tins, say the proponents ofjudicial rulemaking, is ancient
history that tells a half-truth about the judiciary's use of its rulemaking
authority During the twentieth century, "despite crowded dockets and
backlogs, despite a primary interest in adjudication, despite an alleged
inertia and disinclination to act, courts have in fact acted and the results
have not been unworthy "86
Courts have undemably donebetter with their rulemakingpower during
the last two-thirds ofthe twentieth century Legislatures have responded by
delegating to them more and more authority over the field; most prominently, "Congress has accorded to the federal judiciary primary responsibility for its own effectiveness."' But courts have yet to throw off the yoke
of their nineteenth century resistance to the overhaul of a totally obsolete
system, and the fear of renewed inertia and conservatism remains the single
biggest concern about resting control of practice and procedure in the
judiciary, especially control that forecloses all possibility of legislative
intervention.
C. Sources ofRulemalang Power
It is widely accepted that there are three possible sources of power for
judicial rulemaking. The first one is a self-proclaimed "inherent power
based pastoral counseling.
" "The combination ofrulemaking and rule applying roles renders the deciding
judges unable to impartially decide the validity of their own rules." Grau, supra
note 63, at 430.
'4Levin & Amsterdam, supranote 74, at 13-14.
" Kaplan & Greene, supranote 79, at 252.
86Levin & Amsterdam,
supranote 74, at 12.
8 Carrmgton, supra note 80, at 324.
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to prescribe such rules of practice, pleading, and procedure as will facilitate
the administration ofjustice." 8 It is an implied constitutional power that is
derived "from the very nature of judicial power itself," 9 although some
might argue that the "judicial Power" is not so far-reaching: "'Judicial
power
is the power of a court to decide and pronounce ajudgment and
carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before it
for decision.' ""
Because of the emergence of sounder foundations for judicial rulemaking power, whether or not this inherent power to promulgate rules does
indeed exist has been described as a" 'purely academic' "'1 issue. However,
most commentators would likely agree with the observation that "it seems
irrefutable that courts possess a certain measure of inherent rulemaking power."'9 2 They would not agree, however, as to the nature of the
power93 and at least some would say that its "precise scope
may be
debatable. '94
88State v

Roy, 60 P.2d 646,660 (N.M. 1936). See also State v Clemente, 353
A.2d 723 (Conn. 1974); Burney v Lee, 129 P.2d 308 (Anz. 1942).
9 Terry A. Moore, Does the Alabama
Supreme CourtHave the Powerto Make
Rules of Evidence. 25 CuMB. L. REV 331, 332 (1995). See also Southern Pac.
Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 206 So. 2d 334, 335 (Miss. 1968) (holding that "[t]he
phrase 'judicialpower' m section 144 of the [Mississippi] Constitution includes the
power to make rules of practice and procedure, not inconsistent with the
Constitution, for the efficient disposition ofjudicial business").
9 Muskratv United States, 219 U.S. 346,356 (1911) (quoting S.MILLER, THE
CONsTrrTIoN 314 (1891)). See also State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723,728 (Conn.
1974) (holding that "[t]he most basic component of this power is the function of
rendering judgment in cases before the courf).
91Burbank, supra note 73, at 1021 n.19.
2Joiner & Miller, supra note 79, at 626. See also Burbank, supra note 73, at
1116 (agreeing although noting that "arguments [for the power] often reflected the
passion of the reformer more than the detachment of the scholar"); Levin &
Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 3 (agreeing although referring to "an alleged
inherent power to engage in rule-making") (emphasis added).
93Wigmore argued that rulemaking
is so essential to the judicial power that it
preempts the field and renders all legislative encroachment improper and
unconstitutional. See Wigmore, supra note 59, at 276. Reservations about the
validity ofthis position have been expressed by a variety of commentators, see, for
example, Burbank, supra note 73, at 1116, but none more strongly than the
observation that "Wigmore's omnibus argument is better taken as thejeu d'esprit
of a master than as a serious constitutional analysis." Kaplan & Greene, supranote
79, at 251, Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 3.
9 Joiner & Miller, supranote 79, at 626.

1999-2000]

KENTUCKY RULES OF EVIDENCE

The authority of courts over matters of procedure is based in some
jurisdictions on "rules enabling" legislation. Disenchantment with the
nineteenth century procedure codes produced a powerful movement
favoring a transfer of rulemaking responsibility and authority from
legislatures to courts. 9s It appears to have begun in state systems before the
end of the nineteenth century96 but clearly climaxed with the 1934
enactment of the Rules Enabling Act, authorizing the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure for federal courts. It has been
suggested that the rules enabling statutes merely restore to the judiciary
power earlier usurped by legislatures, 97 and that the power granted by such
statutes merely supplements the inherent power described above.9 8 To the
contrary, it is clear that judicial rulemaking in the federal system is based
on delegated authority, and that the enabling statute itself exists at the will
of the legislature.99 In any event, judicial rulemaking is authorized in some
jurisdictions by a statutory grant of power.
In other jurisdictions, the source of power for rulemaking by the
judiciary is an explicit constitutional grant. Some provisions even seem to
require the adoption of rules, perhaps in response to the inertia concern, 1°°
while others speak in terms of authority to act. " 1 They typically authorize
the adoption of rules relating to "procedural matters"' 2 or "practice and
procedure,"103 always clearly suggesting that rulemakuig does not extend
to "substance;" very few explicitly authorize the adoption of evidence
rules.1°4 They usually say nothing of exclusivity of the power but have been
so construed by courts;"0 ' some empower courts to prescribe rules but
9'

See Carrmgton, supranote 80, at 301, see also Pirsig & Tietjen, supra note
65, 96
at 153.
See Carnngton, supra note 80, at 301.
Indeed, itwas the mother ofparliaments-the British Parliament-that first
embraced the idea of transferring responsibility for civil procedure to the
judges themselves. The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 was an imitation of the
English Judicature Act of 1975, already iaitatedby several American states
beginning with Wyoming m 1890.
Id.
97 See Riedl, supranote
57, at 602.
98 See Joiner & Miller, supra note 79, at 626.
" See Kaplan & Greene, supra note 79, at 241.
100 See, e.g., ALASKA CoNsT. art IV, § 15; VT. CoNsT. ch. II, § 37
101 See, e.g., ARiz. CoNsT. art. VI, § 15; Mo. CONST. art. V, § 5.
102ARIz. CoNsT. art. VI, § 5.
'0 3COLO.CONST.

art VI, § 21, NEB. CONST. art V, § 25.
'04 See, e.g., UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
105 See, e.g., Statev. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801 (Ariz. 1987); Walstadv. State, 818
P.2d 695 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
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reserve for legislative bodies a power of review and disapproval." 6
Presumably, they render enabling legislation unnecessary and inherent
powers redundant.
D. FederalRulemaking
The United States Constitution nowhere mentions the power to make
rules of practice and procedure. It vests the "judicial Power" m the
Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress may "ordain and
establish' ' 7 and extends that power to a select list of "Cases" and
"Controversies." ' While there is some historical support for finding
within this power some judicial rulemaking authority,"° the attention of the
Supreme Court has been drawn to the Constitution's language:
[B]y the express terms of the Constitution, the exercise of the judicial
power is limited to "cases" and "controversies." Beyond this it does not
extend, and unless it is asserted in a case or controversy within the
meaning of the Constitution, the power to exercise it is nowhere conferred. 10
Powerful voices sounded in favor of "inherent power" nonetheless,"'
although the best that can be extracted from the pronouncements of the
Court on the point is ambiguity and uncertainty 112

,06See,e.g., FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a); MD.CONST. art. IV, § 18; OHIo CoNsT.

art. IV, § 5(B).

107 U.S. CONST. art Im, §
081Td. § 2.

1.

1 "[I]fanything was received from England as apart of our institutions, it was
that the making of these general rules or practice was a judicial function. Indeed,
this was well understood in the beginning ofAmencan law." Pound, supranote 57,
at 601.
110 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911).
1"See Pound, supranote 57; Wigmore, supranote 59.

The Supreme Court has never satisfactorily explained-indeed it has
hardly discussed-the place of court rulemaking in our constitutional
framework. The early cases
m which the sources and limits of the
rulemakmg power were treated, set a pattern ofambiguity that has not been
departed from. Not even the power of federal courts to regulate procedure
by court rules m the absence of legislative authorization
is made clear
in those cases, and it has not been made clear since.
Burbank, supra note 73, at 1115. See also Comment, supra note 60.
12
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In its early decisions, the Supreme Court left no doubt concerning the
rulemaking authority of Congress. As early as 1825, it indicated that such
authority existed' 13 and shortly thereafter explained more clearly that the
congressional power to ordain and establish inferior courts carries with it
the power "to prescribe and regulate the modes of proceeding in such
Courts." 14' In a more recent and more notable case, the Court expressed
itself ever more vividly on the point: "Congress has undoubted power to
regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that
power by delegating to tis or other federal courts authority to make rules
not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the United States."' 15
The Court has never said that this "undoubted power" is the whole power
to regulate procedure in the federal courts," 6 but in these and other
concessions about congressional authority it has created a clear impression
that "the ultimate rulemaking authority [in the federal system] inheres in
17
Congress."l
Congress elected very early to delegate rulemaking authority to the
federal judiciary " Limitations on this authority lasting into the twentieth
century effectively divided the rulemaking power between the two
branches and produced a very complex and inadequate procedural
system. 1 9 After a lengthy battle over where rulemaking should occur,12 °
Congress substantially expanded its delegation of authority to the judiciary
by enacting the most important procedure statute of the twentieth
century-the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.1' Although refined somewhat
l 3In Wayman v. Southard,23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1 (1825), it ruled that Congress
may properly delegate power to regulate procedure to the courts, plainly implying
that it had such power to delegate. See id. at 43.
"4 Livmgston v Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 656 (1835).
115 Sibbach v Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (footnote omitted).
11
6 "[A]rticle I, section 1,authorizes Congress to prescribe lower federal court
procedure. The congressional authority to prescribe rules of practice andprocedure
is not17exclusive, however." Whitten, supranote 57, at 48-49 (footnotes omitted).
' Gianelfi, supranote 5, at 24-25.
11
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
" 9 While the Supreme Court had authority to adopt rules of procedure for cases
m admiralty and equity (and m fact exercised that authority), Congress required by
statute that federal procedures in actions at common law conform to procedures
used m such actions in state courts. See Whitten, supra note 57, at 48-51,
Comment, supra note 60, at 87-91.
12 See, e.g., Clark, supranote 73, at 145-48; Joseph A. Wickes, The New RuleMalang Power of the United States Supreme Court, 13 TEX. L. REV 1, 3-10
(1934).
121 Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
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since enactment, the essential components of the statute remain intact: "(a)
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure
for cases m the United States distnct courts
(b) Such rules shall not abndge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right."'" In delegating its authority, Congress imposed an obligation on the
Court to report its actions and fixed a deferred effective date for adopted
rules to allow for congressional disapproval if desired.'" It has not often
exercised its disapproval option,"2 but its ability to do so serves as a
reminder that ultimate control over rulemaking for federal courts rests with
Congress.
E. Kentucky Rulemaking
Kentucky's history ofjudicial rulemaking parallels that of the country
Its early constitutional provisions vested "judicial power" m the supreme
court and inferior courts but said nothing of rulemaking by courts.',, Its
first procedural system was inherited from England and lasted until the
General Assemblyjoined the mid-nineteenth century reform movement and
adopted statutory rules of practice and procedure.' 26 The statutory system
lasted through the middle of the twentieth century, until the General
Assembly acted on its own to withdraw from the procedure field. It enacted
a 1952 statute purporting to delegate rulemakmg authority to the supreme
court'27 and directing the court to promulgate rules of practice and pro-

,22 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990).
2
" See id. § 2074.
124 The most dramatic disapproval of court-adopted rules occurred when
Congress deferred the effective date of proposed evidence rules unless and until
enacted into law by Congress. See Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87
Stat. 9 (1973). This is said to have broken a "long-enduring pattern of
congressional acquiescence" in rules adopted by the Court. See Burbank, supra
note 73, at 1018.
2- See KY. CONST, of 1850, art. IV, § 1.
126 SeeAct of Mar. 22, 1851, ch. 616, 1850 Ky. Acts 106. The legislative record
shows the dissatisfaction with the existing system that pushed the reform and the
influence of the recently completed reform that occurred m New York with the
adoption of the famous Field Code. See H.R. Rep., Code of Practice Comm., H.R.
Journal 449, 451-54 (Ky. 1850-5 1).
" It is easy to see from the following language of the statute that the General
Assembly acted to incorporate into the law of Kentucky the essence of the federal
Rules Enabling Act of 1934: "The Court of Appeals, by rules promulgated from
time to time, shall regulate pleading, practice, procedure and the forms thereof in
all civil proceedings in all courts of the state
Such rules shall not abridge,
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cases;128

a decade later, it passed an unusual if not bizarre
cedure for civil
statute that enacted rules of procedure for criminal cases while declaring
that henceforth rules of procedure would be left to the discretion of the
judiciary 129
The supreme court's position on rulemaking powers during thls period
of legislative dominance is unclear. It once wrote that it was "Without
power to set aside [a] Code provision by the adoption of an inconsistent
rule,'9 30 and it seemed to acknowledge legislative supremacy by adopting
rules of civil procedure as directed by the rules enabling legislation of
1952. On the other hand, it stated more than once that courts "have inherent
power to prescribe rules to regulate their proceedings and to facilitate the
administration of justice."' 3' It described the power as "a necessary
mident" to the "judicial power,"132 and held that rules adopted pursuant
thereto would prevail over rules enacted by the legislature 3 3 but offered
little gidance on the reach and limits of the power.
The move from legislative to judicial rulemaking concluded in 1975
with the adoption of Section 116 of the Kentucky Constitution, an explicit
constitutional grant of rulemaking power to the supreme court in the
following language: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe
rules governing its appellate jurisdiction, rules for the appointment of
commissioners and other court personnel, and rules of practice and
procedure for the Court of Justice.
134 There is not much about this
provision in the legislative record of its adoption.'35 It is undoubtedly based
enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant." Act of Feb. 25, 1952, ch.
19, § 1, 1952 Ky. Acts 29
"s"he Court of Appeals shall promulgate the initial rules pursuanttothis Act
on July 1, 1953, and such rules shall become effective on that date." Id.
129See Act of Mar. 22, 1962, ch. 234, 1962 Ky. Acts 788. What qualifies this
legislation as bizarre is a preamble announcing that the authority to regulate court
proceedings is vested m the "judicialpower" held by thejudiciary, that the General
Assembly's intrusion into the area is at the pleasure of the courts "as a matter of
comity," and that in the future the General Assembly will leave the "details of
procedure
to the discretion of the Judicial Department." Id. at 788-89.
130 Tuttle v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.2d 351 (Ky. 1934).
131Craftv. Commonwealth, 343 S.W.2d 150, 151 (Ky. 1961). See also Hobson
v. Kentucky TrustCo. ofLouisville, 197 S.W.2d454 (Ky. 1946), overruledinpart
by Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1964);
Burton v. Mayer, 118 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1938).
112 Burton, 118 S.W.2d at 549; Craft,343 S.W.2d at 151.
33
1 See Burton, 118 S.W.2d at 547
134
Ky.CONST. § 116 (emphasis added).
135 What one finds m the 1974 legislative record is that the judicial reform
article passed the General Assembly without modification and without significant
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on a provision in the 1962 version of the Model State Judicial Article' 36 and
differs from that model solely in its failure to explicitly permit the adoption
of rules of evidence. 137 It is no more or less defintive concerning the
rulemaking power of the judiciary than rules enabling laws of most other
jurisdictions 3 ' but it does remove all doubt about where the power resides.
F

Back to Rule 1102

As described earlier, Rule 1102 uses Kentucky's constitutional
rulemaking provision (Section 116) to define the authorities of the supreme
court and General Assembly to amend the Rules of Evidence. Its approach,
biblically speaking, is to render unto the supreme court what is the court's
and unto the General Assembly what is the Assembly's-exclusive
ultimate control of "practice and procedure" to the court and exclusive
ultimate control of "substance" to the Assembly What it renders to the
court and to the General Assembly in specific terms requires further
inquiry What is "practice and procedure" and what is "substance?" Where
does "procedure" end and "substance" begin in the law of evidence? The
first of these issues is addressed in Part HI of the Article and the second is
addressed in Part IV
III. PROCEDURE VS. SUBSTANCE

A. Introduction
Some grants ofrulemaking authority use the word "practice,"' 39 others
use "procedure,"' 4 ° while still others (like Section 116) use "practice and

debate. CompareS.B. 183, SenateJournal, at 641-45 (Ky. 1974) with Act of Mar.
20, 1974, ch. 84, 1974 Ky. Acts 168.
136 MODEL STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE § 9 (1962), reprinted in 47 J. AM.
JUDICATURE Soc'y 6, 12 (1963).
137 The crucial part of the model reads as follows: "The Supreme Court shall
have the power to prescribe rules governing appellate jurisdiction, rules ofpractice
and procedure, and rules of evidence, for the judicial system." Id.
138 The supreme court has ruled that its power under the provision is "exclusive." See Turner v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 980 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Ky. 1998). It
has found legislative infringement of that exclusive power from time to time. See,
e.g., O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1995); Drumm v.
Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1990); Games v Commonwealth, 728
S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1987). But it has not attempted to define the terms "practice and
procedure" or to delineate the exact limits of its rulemaking power under the
provision.
'

39

MICH. CONST. of 1908 art. VII, § 5.

,40 ARIz. CONST. art VI, § 5; N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
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procedure."14' All are designed to reach the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties and are generally viewed as legal equivalents: "Considermg the accepted definitions of the terms 'practice' and 'procedure,' and
recognizing the types ofmatters which have been held to be within the term
'practice' as used m the rule-making grant of authority, it seems clear that
the words are generally used synonymously "'42 Unlike some grants of
rulemaking authority, 43 Section 116 does not explicitly foreclose judicial
intrusion upon "substantive rights." Yet it could hardly be clearer that the
legislature reigns supreme over matters affecting such rights and that the
dichotomy demanded by the provision is between "substance" and
"procedure." 1"
It is well-known that "substance" oftentimes gets packaged as
"procedure"--what has been described as "substantive considerations
secreted m procedural interstices."' 5 The parole evidence rule is perfectly
illustrative, an example of substantive law camouflaged as a rule of
evidence; others are better disguised, less obviously substantive, and more
difficult to classify It is also well-known that "substance" and "procedure"
oftentimes get jointly packaged in a single product. Statutes of limitations
are illustrative of such jointly-packaged laws; they are procedural in the
sense that they guard against erroneous decisions on "stale" claims but, at
the same time, are substantive in the sense that they serve to reduce stress
and anxiety in the citizenry Classification in these situations is especially
difficult, partly because substance and procedure are almost inextricably
intertwined and partly because the two concepts remain imprecisely
defined even after decades of development.
The words "substance" and "procedure" have been described as
"mystic," 1' vague,147 and "elusive."' 48 Most authorities accept the difficulty
of distinguishing between the two concepts; 149 some have tended to
4' ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15; Oio CoNST. art. IV, § 5(3).
'42 Jomer & Miller, supra note 79, at 634.
14 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982); OIHo CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

'44 "Nothing could be clearer than the fact that courts in the exercise of the rulemaking power have no competence to promulgate rules governing substantive law."
Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 14. "It is fundamental that court rules cannot
abrogate or modify substantive law." Joiner & Miller, supra note 79, at 634.
141 Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 19.
146 Carrmgton, supranote 80, at 284.

147 See Thomas Green, Jr., To WhatExtentMay Courts Under the Rule-Making
PowerPrescribeRules ofEvidence, 26 A.B.A.J. 482, 483 (1940).
14' Burbank, supra note 73, at 1188.

149 "[S]ubstance and procedure differ even if, at the margin, they become
difficult to distinguish." Carrmgton, supranote 80, at 284.
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overstate the difficulty, describing the distinction as "impossible."' 5
Hardly anyone would claim that there is a bright line separating the two,
but most lawyers andjudges would agree with Professor Ely's observation
that "[w]e have, I think, a moderately clear notion of what aprocedural rule
is.""' Whether we do or not, it is clear that the concepts play crucial roles
in the law and have to be distinguished no matter how difficult that task
might be, as Justice Rutledge noted more than fifty years ago: "[I]n many
situations procedure and substance are so interwoven that rational
separation becomes well-nigh Impossible. But, even so, tls fact cannot
dispense with the necessity of making a distinction.
Judges therefore
cannot escape making the division."'5 Contrary to tis statement, the
difficulty does not in fact exist in "many" situations, for m most instances,
the distinction between substance and procedure is so clear that no question
arises. The difficulty arises only in what Professor Cook m his classic
article called a "no-man's land,"' 53 situations in which "the substantive
shades off by imperceptible degrees into the procedural"'" 4 and makes
almost any decision "appear to some extent arbitrary " 5
The distinction between procedure and substance is made for a variety
of legal purposes. It is made, for example, m determining the reach of the
law's prohibition against ex post facto laws 56 and m the application of
principles governing choice-of-law issues.157 It is also made m resolving
,SO "[B]ecause of carelessness in the use of the terms
it is now Impossible
to determine what is meant by the terms 'substantive law' and 'procedural law."'
Riedl, supra note 57, at 604. See also Levm & Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 14
("Yet virtually everyone concedes that 'rational separation is well-nigh
impossible."').
15John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth ofErie, 87 HARV L. REV 693, 724
(1974).
52Cohenv.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,559 (1949) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting). See also Levm & Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 20 ("No clearly
preferable alternatives have been forthcoming and constitutions continue to use the
familiar phrase. Consequently, it remains necessary to deal with its meaning.").
"' Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of
Laws,
42 YALE L.J. 333, 351 (1933).
154Id.at 343.
55
1 Id. at 356.
116
In Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884), the Supreme Court said that the
prohibition against ex post facto laws does not extend to statutes involving modes of
procedure. In Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898), it refused to extend the
prohibition to a statute "regarded as one merely regulating procedure." Id at 388.
"' While courts may look to the law of a foreign state in dealing with matters
of substance, they will look to the law of the forum in dealing with matters of
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disputes over whether federal or state law should govern m federal
diversity of citizenship cases'58 and, most importantly for our purposes, m
determining the limits ofthejudiciary's power to make rules of court. Cook
warned against an assumption that substance and procedure have universal
meanings for all purposes,'59 and the Supreme Court concurred m Hanna
v. Plumer'6 when it said that "It]he line between 'substance' and
'procedure' shifts as the legal context changes." '' No one suggests that
decisions rendered for one purpose are meaningless with respect to
another, 62 only that "what may be considered procedural for one purpose
may be considered substantive for another."' 63
B. The Rules EnablingAct
The distinction between substance and procedure is examined m this
Article for the purpose of allocating lawmaking authority between the
legislative and judicial branches of government. The best source of
guidance on the subject is undoubtedly the federal Rules Enabling Act,
wich has remained largely intact and drawn heavy attention from courts,
lawmakers and scholars for more than six decades. In its pertinent
provisions, the statute reads as follows: "(a) The Supreme Court shall have
the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure
for cases
m the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals. (b) Such rules shall not abndge, enlarge or modify any substantive nght."',, Although much has been debated
procedure. See Cook, supra note 153, at 351.
"I See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938).
59
'
Ifone glances back over this list of purposes for which the distinction under
discussion is drawn, one sees at once that a person asking where the line ought to
be drawn might well conclude that this ought to be at one place for one purpose
and at a somewhat different place for another purpose. See Cook, supranote 153,
at 343.
"6
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
61
d.at 471.
162 As noted by Cook, supranote 153, at 344:
"This is not to say that they ought to have no weight at all; far from it. It is
merely to point out that at most they make out aprnmafaciecase, and even
that is perhaps to overstate the case for their use as precedents in really
doubtful cases involving different purposes."
163 Joiner & Miller, supra note 79, at 635.
164
28

U.S.C. §2072 (1994).
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about the objectives and coverage ofthe enabling statute,1 6 no one disputes
that its principal thrust was to delegate Congress's power over practice and
procedure to the Supreme Court. Almost immediately after enactment of
the statute, the Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and set
the stage for the first of its most influential opinions on the meaning of the
words "practice and procedure"--Sibbachv. Wilson & Co."
Sibbach was a personal injury action brought m federal court under
diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff was ordered to submit to a physical
examination, as authorized by a newly adopted federal rule, but refused,
contending that adoption of the examination rule exceeded the Supreme
Court's authority under the Enabling Act. 67 The Court rejected this
contention, sustained the examination rule, and provided the following
definition of procedure: "The test must be whether a rule really regulates
procedure,-thejudicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
disregard or infraction of them. 1 6 There is no litmus test m the conclusions that procedure "really regulates procedure" and substance recognizes
"rights and duties." Perhaps knowing this, the Court added that rules
adopted under the Enabling Act must pass muster under its policy of
promoting court procedures that foster a "speedy, fair and exact determination of the truth."' 169 Sixty years after Sibbach, when physical examinations
of plaintiffs are routine, it is easy to see that the examination rule fostered
a fair determination of issues concerning the nature and extent of the
plaintiff's injuries, and that it could easily be classified as "procedure"
rather than "substance."' 7 °

Scholars have differed over whether Congress was acting to allocate
lawmaking powers between thejudicial and legislative branches of government or
to address the very different problem of choosing between state and federal law in
federal diversity cases; they have also differed over the relationshup of the two
subsections of the statute and specifically whether the second part of the statute
serves any purpose not served by the first part. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 151,
Burbank, supra note 73; Carrington, supranote 80.
166 Sibbach v Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
167 The plaintiff did not contend that the examination rule failed under the
"practice and procedure" requirement of the Act's first sentence, but rather that it
constituted an abridgment of substantive rights and thus violated the limitation
fixed6 by the Act's second sentence.
1 1 Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.
165

169 _Td.

17oSibbach split

the Court 5-4, indicating that classification of the rule was far
more difficult when physical examination was not routine. In writing for the
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Sibbach was decided only three years after the landmark decision in
Erie Railroad v. Tompkns. 1 1 It was rendered as a decision on the
rulemaking authority of the judiciary but became engulfed in the federal/state choice-of-laws issues produced by the decision in Erie Railroad,
where the substance/procedure distinction is also important. For more than
two decades, lower courts struggled with the relationship of the two
decisions and with questions about the applicability in diversity cases of
federal rules of procedure that contradict provisions of state law 172 The
Supreme Court rendered a series of unsettling decisions on these subjects'73
before issuing its watershed opinion in Hanna v. Plumer 174
Hanna was also a personal injury claim filed in federal court under
diversity jurisdiction. It was filed in time to satisfy an applicable state
statute of limitations if the adequacy of service of process was adjudged
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide for delivery of
process to a defendant's residence, but not if adjudged under a provision of
the state limitations statute which required personal service upon the
defendant. 75 The trial court concluded that state law governed and granted
summary judgment for the defendant; 17 the court of appeals affirmed,
describing the dispute as a "substantive rather than a procedural matter"
dissenters, Justice Frankfurter saw the examination rule as too much of"a drastic
change m public policy" to fall within authorization to formulate rules for the
effective dispatch of court business. "I deem a requirement as to the invasion of the
person to stand on a very different footing from questions pertaining to the
discovery of documents, pre-tnal procedure and other devices for the expeditious,
economic and fair conduct of litigation." Id. at 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
M Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7 See, e.g., Fontenot v. Roach, 120 F Supp. 788 (E.D. Tenn. 1954); Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California v. Kielhorn, 98 F Supp. 288 (W.D. Mich. 1951);
Bohn v. American Export Lines, 42 F Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y 1941); Jeub v B/G
Foods, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 238 (D. Minn. 1942).
173 See, e.g., Ragan v Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530
(1949); Cohen v Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Mississippi
Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
74 Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 (1965).
75
1 See id. at 461. The plaintiff had left copies of the summons and complaint
with the defendant's spouse at his residence. See t.
176By this time, the Supreme Court had rendered its decision m GuarantyTrust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), holding that the choice between state and federal
law in diversity cases would be determined by application of an outcomedeterminative test----"the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be
substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation,
as it would be if tried m a State court." Id. at 109.
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and concluding that Erie required reliance on state rather than federal
law 177 The question posed for the Supreme Court by these rulings was
whether "service of process [in diversity litigation] shall be made in the
manner prescribed by state law or that set forth in Rule 4(d)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'' 8 The Court concluded that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure controlled the service of process issue and

reversed. 179
The Court for the first time drew a sharp line between the two issues
that had coalesced in earlier opiuons: the authority of the Court to adopt
rules of procedure and the constitutional obligation of federal courts to
apply state law in diversity cases. The first, a separation of powers
problem, is governed by the Rules Enabling Act; the second, a federalism
problem, is governed byEne Railroadand its progeny ' 0 More importantly
for our purposes, in speaking of rulemaking powers, the Court reaffirmed
its Sibbach definition of "procedure" and then added a yardstick by which
to measure rules that may have both substantive and procedural components:
[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system
cames with
it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading
m those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which,
though falling within the uncertain areabetween substance andprocedure,
8
are rationally capable of classification as either.'1
Justice Harlan suggested in his concurring opimon that this test, which he
characterized as an "arguably procedural"'8 2 test, was overly generous in
its description of rulemaking authority and that it did little to ease the
difficulty of distinguishing between "substance" and "procedure."'8 3 In a

'..
See Hanna,380 U.S. at 463.
'78Id. at 461.
'..See id. at 463-64.
180 "It is true that both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that
federal courts are to apply state 'substantive' law and federal 'procedural' law, but
from that it need not follow that the tests are identical. For they were designed to
control
very different sorts of decisions." Id. at 471.
181Id. at 472.
' Id. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring).
,83 His concern was the effect of the expansive definition on federalism pnnciples: "So long as a reasonable man could characterize any duly adopted federal
rule as 'procedural,' the Court
would have it apply no matter how seriously it
frustrated a State's substantive regulation of the primary conduct and affairs of its

1999-2000]

KENTuCKY RuLEs OF EVIDENCE

later opinion, the Court may have intended to qualify its position when it
said that court-adopted rules may have an "incidental" effect on substantive
rights without exceeding the rulemaking authority of the Rules Enabling
Act. 184
Although the Rules Enabling Act and these cases do not draw a clear
line between "substance" and "procedure," they shed meaningful light on
the subject in several ways. Sibbachreassures us that we do indeed have a
"moderately clear notion" of what rules of procedure look like and, by
insisting that court rules "really" regulate procedure, it warns against
decisions that intrude upon areas that are clearly inappropriate for the
judiciary Hanna draws attention to the reality that "substance" and
"procedure" are not mutually exclusive and oftentimes intermingle in
single rules; it identifies the need for a standard for classifying such rules,
even though the one it suggests might indeed be overly generous in its
allocation of rulemaking power to the judiciary
C. ScholarlyDissertations
Legal scholars wrote extensively about the substance/procedure
distinction long before controversy erupted over whether courts or
legislatures should enact evidence rules,8 5 although others were moved to
write on the subject after Congress disrupted the judicial effort to produce
federal rules of evidence.1 8 They have elevated the discussion by more
clearly identifying underlying policies and by drawing attention to those
policies rather than to formulas for the solution of particular problems.
They have provided no litmus test for malng the distinction but have
moved beyond Sibbach and Hanna in efforts to formulate standards by
which to distinguish substance from procedure in concrete situations.
One of the first influential descriptions of the distinction between
substance and procedure was offered by Riedl, who thought that formulation of a distinction was "impossible.""1 7 The judiciary is given rulemaking
power, he said, to provide "the people an efficient, adequate, simple,

citizens." Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
' 4See BurlingtonN. RL1R v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1,5 (1987). See also Carrngton,
supranote 80, at 299 ("Implied in BurlingtonNorthern is a constraint on rules of
court affecting substantive rights in ways that are more than 'incidental."').
181 See, e.g., Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 74; Joiner & Miller, supra note
79. 86
1 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 151, Burbank, supranote 73.
8 7 Riedl, supra note 57, at 604.
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prompt, and inexpensive admimstration ofjustice"1'
power is limited to the purpose for which it exists:
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8

and the reach of that

The test we propose is whether a given rule is a device with wlch to
promote the adequate, simple, prompt and inexpensive administration of
justice m the conduct of a trial or whether the rule, having nothing to do
with procedure, is grounded upon a declaration of a general public
policy.

189

He wrote before Hanna, oversimplified the problem by inadequately
considering the extent to which substance and procedure intermingle m
single rules, and was criticized for having assumed that rules "fall neatly
into one of two pigeon-holes."19 Yet he advanced the discussion by
drawing the distinction between rules that promote an effective justice
system and laws that express some "[g]eneral [p]ublic [p]olicy "191
Another of the earlier commentators on the substance/procedure
distinction was Professor Joiner, who published after Sibbach and before
92 In citing Riedl approvingly, 93
Hanna.1
he acknowledged the difficulty of
segregating governmental functions, calling it "a twilight zone of
indefinition' 94 and said that it must be recognized "that there are areas m
which it is not clear whether the legislature or thejudiciary should establish
the necessary rules." 9 He described the rulemaking power as broad but
proposed a conservative standard for distinguishing between substance and
procedure:
If the purpose of [a rule's] promulgation is to permit a court to function
and function efficiently, the rule-making power is inherent unless its
impact is such as to conflict with other validly enacted legislative or

'88 Id.
at 605.
9
,1Id. at 604.
'9 "The difficulty with Riedl's test is in its major premise. It assumes that the
rules
which courts will be concerned about categorizing, fall neatly into one of
two pigeon-holes: 'declaration of public policy' or 'rule to promote the prompt,
inexpensive administration ofjustice.' Nothing could be further from the truth
"Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 21.
191
Id. at 22 (footnote omitted).
'
Joiner & Miller, supra note 79.
' See id. at 635.
'94Id. at 629.
195
Id.
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constitutional policy involving matters other than the orderly dispatch of
judicial business.
Thus when the purpose of the rule is to provide for the establishment and maintenance of the machinery essential for the efficient
administration of business, and it does only that,the scope of the inherent
96
power vested in the courts is complete and supreme.

Joiner made his view even clearer m a later writing, saying that court rules
must "regulate the method ofproving cases" and inplicate "no other policy
involving matters other than the orderly dispatch of judicial
business."' 197 There is "procedural purity" required by this standard that
would seem to tilt the delicate balance as much toward "substance" as

Hanna would later tilt it toward "procedure," leading some to say that
Joiner's position "excludes too much"'198 from the rulemaking authority of
the judiciary
Levin and Amsterdam advanced the discussion without attempting to
precisely locate the line between substance and procedure. They described

that task as "well-mgh impossible," 199 and noted the special difficulty when
procedure is "intimately related with substantive considerations" ' ° but

conceded that use of the distinction is not likely to disappear.20' They
sounded like other commentators when describing the factors to be
weighed and the difficulty of weighng them:
When we turn to the problem of privilege we meet the classic example of
substantive law in the rules of evidence. Extrinsic policy considerations are said to be operative and paramount. This is indeed true, but it
must not be forgotten that the orderly dispatch of litigation, with
the maximum information from permitted sources made available to
the tribunal, is also a consideration and is, itself, a matter of high
20 2
policy.
'91 Id. at
197

629-30 (emphasis added).
Charles Joiner, Uniform Rules ofEvidencefor FederalCourts, 20 F.RLD.

429,434
(1957).
98
"'
Levm & Amsterdam, supranote 74, at 23.
199
Id. at 15 (footnote omitted).
2
00°Id. at 18.
20
"No clearly preferable alternatives have been forthcoming and constitutions
continue to use the familiar phrase ["practice and procedure"]. Consequently, it
remains
necessary to deal with its meaning." Id. at 20.
22
" Id.at 22 (emphasis added).
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They expressed concern almost simultaneously about "ceding too much to
the legislature 2 03 and about excessive assumptions of authority by the
judiciary

204

One of the most influential writings on the substance/procedure
distinction was penned by Professor Ely, 0 5 whose eye was primarily on
federalism issues while he wrote about Sibbach, Hanna, and the Rules
Enabling Act.20 6 In the midst of matters not very relevant to the present
discussion, he provided descriptions of "substance" and "procedure" that
are notable, if not remarkable, in their clarity and simplicity"
We have, I think, some moderately clear notion of what a procedural rule
is--one designed to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient
mechamsm for the resolution of disputes. Thus, one way of doing things
may be chosen over another because it is thought to be more likely to get
at the truth, or better calculated to give the parties afairopportunityto
present their sides of the story, or because, and this may point quite the
other way, it is a means ofpromotingthe efficiency oftheprocess. The
most helpful way, it seems to me, of defining a substantive nile
is as
a [rule created] for one or more nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose
or purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of the
20 7
litigation process.
It is helpful, he said, to think of substance as laws that "'affect people's
conduct at the stage of primary private activity"'2 0 and necessary m
20 3

1 d. at 23.
24"It is certainly

true
that a court immunized from any review of its own
determinations as to what is within its rule-making power as well as from any veto
over what it chooses to promulgate, may prove too prone to assume authority." Iad
at 24
(footnote omitted).
20
s See Ely, supra note 151.

Ely was focused on the problem of determining whether federal or state law
applies m federal diversity cases (and particularly the extent to which the Rules
Enabling Act bears upon that problem). As described above, there is a difference
between this problem and the rulemaking power problem that is the subject of
discussion m this Article, although both are resolved to some extent by the
substance/procedure distinction. One must stnply be aware that the distinctionmay
be somewhat different in the two situations, although classification of given rules
for one purpose should offer helpful guidance for classification for the other
purpose.
207 Ely, supra note 151, at 724-25 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
201 d. at 725 (footnote omitted). Laws that
affect "pnvate primary activity" are
sometimes referred to as laws that "affect out of court conduct." Burbank, supra
2'
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classifying a law to determine whether it "embodies a substantive policy
or
[promotes] the fairest and most efficient way of conducting
litigation." ' He recogmzed that classification by this standard would
sometimes produce inconclusive separation of substance and procedure:
[I]t is not at all unlikely that with respect to a given rule the legislature or
other rulemaker will have had two (or more) goals in mind--one relating
to the managment of litigation and one relating to some other concern.
Under the definitions suggested above, such a rule would be both
210
procedural and substantive.
Ely's analytical objectives were met without further classification of such
rules.2 1 What he might do if forced to classify such rules is unclear, for he
says little about the "arguably procedural" test of Hanna and nothing to
suggest that he might embrace the idea of a "procedural purity" test. There
are indications, albeit obscure, that if compelled to classify such a rule he
would be guided by the predominant purpose underlying the rule.21 2
Professor Burbank examined the substance/procedure distinction in an
unpressive study ofjudicial rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling
Act.213 He recognized the difficulty of applying the distinction2 14 and
emphasized the great iuportance ofunderstanding the fundamental purpose
for making the distinction: "The goal of the characterization exercise

note2 73, at 1128.
Ely, supra note 151, at 722.
210 Id. at 726.
211 Ely's research interest involved the question of whether the Rules Enabling
Act protected state prerogatives from federal incursion in diversity cases. Part one
of the Rules Enabling Act authorizes the Supreme Court to adopt rules of practice
and procedure; part two provides that such rules shall not abridge substantive
rights. He concluded that rules mixed with substance and procedure could be
construed as satisfying part one of the statute without further classification since
substantive
state policies would be protected by part two. See id. at 726-27
21
2 In one instance, when discussing whether a rule mixed with substance and
procedure could survive the prohibition against abridging substantive rights, he
focused on what he described as the "primary reason" for enactment of the rule. Id.
at 728. In another instance, when discussing this question, he opined that a rule
should be counted as "substantive" because its purpose"transcends concerns about
how2 litigation
is conducted." Id. at 734.
3 See Burbank,
supra note 73.
214"Everybody knows that 'procedure' and 'substance' are elusive words that
must be approached in context, and that there canbe no one, indeed any, bright line
to mark off their respective preserves." Id. at 1187-88.
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is to determine the locus of decision-malangconcerning
a particular
matter, the Supreme Court making law through rules of court or
Congress.""2 5 The keystone is whether the particular matter is designed to
foster a more intelligent disposition of issues in litigation. "Thus, if
lawmaking in an area necessarily involves the consideration of public
policy-policies extrinsic to theprocess of litigation-thechoices in that
area are for [the legislature]. 216 He suggested no particular standard for
classifying rules that have both procedural and substantive components but
expressed serious reservations about the "arguably procedural" test of
Hanna.217
Professor Carrington also expressed strong reservations about Hanna
in Ins study of rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act. 1 He
believed that the Court had focused on federalism issues in Hannaand had
given inadequate attention to separation of powers issues. He labeled the
"arguably procedural" expression as a "false step"219 and said that it had
"led us offthe trail with respect to the Court's power to enact
law based
on the broad penumbra of the substance-procedure distinction." ' He
believed, however, that the Court had moderated its view in Burlington
Northern Railroad v. Woods22 and had put us back on trail, clearly
implying there that rulemaking would not be permitted to affect substantive
rights "in ways that are more than 'incidental.'""22
Carrington focused more explicitly than others on rules that are "at
once both substantive and procedural."'2' His reflections on the merger of
substance and procedure in statutes of limtations indicate the importance

215 Id. at

1123 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1190 (emphasis added).
217 Legal rules always represent choices among conflicting policies. It is
21

well and good to uphold the constitutional'power of Congress to "regulate
matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance
and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either." But there
is reason to fear that, if the rulemakers are left to make choices in such
areas, and whatever the purpose of the dichotomy, they will choose to
advance those policies that are their special province and to subordinate
those that are not.
Id. at 1191-92 (footnotes omitted).
21
1 See Carrington, supra note 80.
219

Id. at 297
220 Id. at 298.

22Burlington N. R.R. v Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
80, at 299.
2Id. at 290.
222Carrgton, supranote
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of identifying the underlying objectives of any rule that has to be classified
as one or the other, such as our rules of evidence:
Limitations law is famously a body of rules that are neither grass nor hay,
being at once both substantive and procedural. In one sense, limitations
law is clearly procedural
It is a means of clearing dockets
[and]
also a crude means of evaluating proof, a device to protect fact finders
from being beguiled by stale, and therefore, suspect proof.
In another sense, however, limitations law is substantive. Repose is
a social and political value with economic consequences. Limitations law
is thus a means of healing and stablizing relationships. It reduces the
general level of stress and anxiety. 224
According to Carnington, such rules rest at the margin of substance and
procedure and may be classified as either, depending upon relative weights
of underlying objectives. If substantive considerations are paramount, such
rules should be classified as substance rather than procedure.'
D. Kentucky Supreme Court
The Kentucky Supreme Court has come no closer to defining
"procedure" than to say that its rulemaking power extends only to matters
that affect "the orderly dispatch of litigation." 6 It has been far more prone
to express itself on the difficulty of drawing a line between substance and
procedure than to attempt a formulation of standards by which to undertake
such a task: "Inevitably, there is and always will be a gray area in which a
line between the legislative prerogatives of the General Assembly and the
rule-making authority of the courts is not easy to draw " 7 The court has
also been prone to avoid full confrontation with this difficulty by resorting
to the use of an approach called "comity," an acceptance of legislative

4

Id. (footnotes omitted).
See also Charles Alan Wright, ProceduralReform: Its Limitations andIts
Future, 1 GA. L. REv 563, 569 (1967) ("Most people would agree, I think, that
substantive changes should come from the legislature
This should be as true
where the substantive change is the side effect of a procedural reform as where it
is made directly.").
16 WarfieldNat Gas Co. v. Allen, 33 S.W.2d 34,35 (Ky. 1930). See also Craft
v. Commonwealth, 343 S.W.2d 150, 151 (Ky. 1961).
227Exparte Auditor of Pub. Accounts, 609
S.W.2d 682, 688 (Ky. 1980). See
also Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Ky. 1987).
"
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intrusion into judicial territory when the intrusion is adjudged to have
enhanced rather than impaired the judicial function. n 8
It is not easy to extract guidance on the substance/procedure distinction
from decisions in concrete situations. Tendencies are easier to see than
standards and guidelines. The supreme court has rarely imposed meaningful limitations on its own authority, 9 has acted very aggressively against
any legislation that even remotely threatens its ability to engage in effective
dispute resolution, 3° and has generally adhered to "our moderately clear
notion" ofprocedure and substance in inplementing the distinction.23' But,
it has also rendered decisions that seem to be ad hoc in nature, rather than

analytical, and that fall far short of producing a coherent and consistent
view of where procedure ends and substance begins. The leading case,
O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth,232 is illustrative of these conditions.
18 "Comity,"

by definition, means judicial adoption of a rule unconstitutionally enacted by the legislature "not as a matter of obligation, but
out of deference and respect."
The decision whether to give life
through comity to a statute otherwise unconstitutional because it violates
separation ofpowers doctrine is one of institutional policy reserved for the
Supreme Court level.
O'Bryan v Hegespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Ky. 1995) (citations omitted).
"' There is one case in which the court took such action, holding that "the
power
of a court or magistrate to take away a person's liberty [under a rule of
court authorizing peace bonds] is a matter of substance, and cannot originate from
the judicial power to regulate practice and procedure in the courts." Lunsford v
Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Ky 1969).
"soSee, e.g., Smothers v. Lewis, 672 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1984) (ruling that a statute
attempting to limit the authority of courts to grant mjunctive relief in a case within
its jurisdiction infringes upon the judicial function); Arnett v. Meade, 462 S.W.2d
940 (Ky. 1971) (holding that the legislature has no authority to limit the extent of
punishment a court may inpose on a witness who refuses an order to testify);
Burton v Mayer, 118 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1938) (ruling that the legislature may not
impair the ability of a court to issue an innmediate mandate in a case where an
effective adminstration of justice so requires).
" See, e.g., Drumm v. Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1990) (holding
that the statute creating child abuse hearsay exception is an exercise of judicial
rulemaking power); Games v. Commonwealth, 728 S.W.2d 525 (Ky 1987)
(holding that the statute authorizing children to testify on videotape without oath
and without being found competent as a witness is procedural rather than
substance); O'Bryanv Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1982) (holding that
a law dealing with hearing on motion for change of venue is procedural); Parragin
v Sawyer, 457 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1970) (expressing grave doubts about the
constitutionality of a statute dealing with taxation of costs to litigants).
2 O'Bryan v Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1995).
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O'Bryan involved litigation over personal Injuries produced by an
automobile accident. The trial judge ruled that the defendant could
introduce evidence that the plaintiff had been reimbursed for certain costs
attributable to the accident, so-called "collateral source payments," '3 under
a statute providing for the admssibility of such evidence in an action for
damages." The plaintiff argued on appeal that the statute infringed upon
the rulemaking power of the supreme court, as defined by Section 116 of
the Constitution. The Kentucky Court of Appeals disagreed, 5 but the
supreme court granted discretionary review and reversed.
The supreme court looked at the statute, saw a rule bearing on
adrmssibility of evidence, and easily concluded that its rulemaking
authority had been violated:
Responsibility for deciding when evidence is relevant to an issue of fact
which must be judicially determined, such as the medical expenses
incurred for treatment of personal injuries, falls squarely within the
parametersof 'practice andprocedure" assigned to the judicial branch
by the separation of powers doctrine and Section 116.36
It had not always so easily concluded that evidence rules belonged under
its rulemaking authority; 37 nor had it ever expressed serious doubts about

3 Id.
at

573. The evidence was actually introduced by the plaintiff but only
after she had lost an in limme motion to exclude the evidence. See id.The Supreme
Court easily rejected an argument that the plaintiff had not preserved error for
review. See id. at 574.
4 The statute also obligated the plaintiff to give notice to parties holding
subrogation rights to any award he might receive and indicated that such rights
would be lost unless the holder intervened to make claims. See K.R.S. § 411.188.
The key provision in the statute, however, was undoubtedly the provision allowing
a defendant to show that the plaintiffhad received collateral source payments. See
id.
23 See O'Bryan, 892 S.W.2d at 574. The court of appeals had earlier
encountered this same argument in another case and it had there ruled that the
statute did not infringe upon the rulemaking authority of the supreme court. See
Edwards v Land, 851 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. App. 1992).
236 0'Bryan, 892 S.W.2d at 576 (emphasis added).
" See, e.g., Gaines v. Commonwealth, 728 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1987) (finding a
violation of judicial rulemakmg power by a statute creating child abuse hearsay
exception); Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986) (holding that
legislation authorizing the use of television cameras to present testimony in child
abuse prosecution, at the discretion of the trial court, does not invade any judicial
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the many evidence statutes it had regularly construed before the adoption
of evidence rules, such as the dead man's act, the spousal privilege statute,
a former testimony statute, etc."$ There was no mention of this history and
no obvious recognition of the complexity of the substance/procedure
distinction. The ruling was more formalistic than analytical.
There can be no quarrel with the court's conclusion that the "collateral
source payments" statute was procedural m nature. The quarrel is with its
assumption that the statute was only procedural or predominantly
procedural. In explaining its decision that the statute was procedural, the
court focused almost immediately upon what surely rests on the substance
side of the substance/procedure dichotomy-whether an injured party
should get "double recovery" or a tortfeasor (or his/her insurer) should get
a "wmdfall.i ' ' 9 Yet, it never seriously considered the possibility that the
statute was not about the admissibility of evidence, but was instead
substance merely packaged as procedure--"substantive considerations
secreted m procedural interstices.""24 More fundamentally, it seemed not
to have fully considered the question of whether the statute expressed
policy choices that should be made by a lawmaking body that is more
subject to the popular will than is the court, whose constitutional function

power); Commonwealth v. Kroger, 122 S.W.2d 1006 (Ky. 1938) (finding that
legislature may constitutionally provide that a certain state of facts is prima facie
evidence of a disputed fact); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bush, 33 S.W.2d
351 (Ky. 1930) (holding that a statute making death certificate admissible to prove
cause of death is within the power of the legislature).
" See, e.g., Smith v Commonwealth, 788 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1990) (construing
spousal pnvileges statute); Richmond v. Commonwealth, 637 S.W.2d 642 (Ky.
1982) (construing former testimony statute); Creason v Creason, 392 S.W.2d 69
(Ky. 1965) (construing dead man's statute).
239 The following statement from the opinion clearly speaks of a policy choice
that has absolutely nothing to do with the process of litigation:
There is no legal reason why the tortfeasor or his liability insurance
company should receive a"windfall" for benefits to which the plaintiffmay
be entitled by reason of ins own foresight in paying the premium or as part
of what he has earned in his employment, and benefits received are usually
subject to subrogation so there is no "double recovery" by any stretch ofthe
imagination.
O'Bryan, 892 S.W.2d at 576.
The Court noted that this was the law before the enactment of the "collateral
source payments" statute, strongly expressed the belief that this position was
legally sound, but said nothing about whether it should have an exclusive right to
make
this choice for the people.
24 Levin & Amsterdam,
supra note 74, at 19.
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"is to resolve disputes. 2 4' The decision in O'Bryan might not have been
different had the court engaged m a fuller analysis of the separation of
powers problem. It would have drawn attention to the fundamental purpose
of the substance/procedure distinction, however, and would have laid some
groundwork for the development of a conceptual rather than ad hoe
approach to the problem.
E. Conclusion
The best authorities concur as to basic propositions concerning the
substance/procedure distinction. "Procedure" is the machinery that governs
events in the court system; "substance" is the rest of the legal universe.2 42
The concepts are clear enough to permit most rules to be pigeon-holed with
ease; classification is difficult on the margin where procedure "shades
imperceptibly" into substance. Substance is occasionally packaged as
procedure, and substance and procedure are oftentimes packaged m a single
container. The former should always be classified as "substance" while
classification of the latter should depend upon the relative weight of the
underlying substantive and procedural considerations. The mixed rules
should be classified as "substance" when policy considerations having no
bearing on the litigation process are paramount and as "procedure" when
they primarily affect litigation and only incidentally affect extrinsic policy
considerations.
IV

PROCEDURE, SUBSTANCE, AND EVIDENCE LAW

A. Introduction
Uncertainty over whether "practice and procedure" includes the law of
evidence surfaced immediately upon the 1934 enactment of the Rules
Enabling Act.24 It survived the 193 8 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
24

ExparteFarley, 570 S.W.2d 617, 623 (Ky. 1978).
Substance is sometimes described as the "what' of the law with procedure
being the "how." Sometimes it is said to be the part that creates the rights and
duties that are enforced in the courtroom, and sometimes it is described as rules that
affect events and conditions outside the courtroom. Professor Morgan offered the
following definition: "[R]ules which determine the legal relations between the
parties when all the facts are known or assumed are rules of substance." Edmund
M. Morgan, Rules ofEvidence-Substantive orProcedural,10 VAND.L.REv 467,
468 (1957).
24 The chairman of the committee appointed to draft civil rules said that there
was a difference of opinion as to whether the Enabling Act covered rules of
242
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Procedure 2' only to surface twenty-five years later when the Supreme
Court began to consider the adoption of evidence rules. On this later
occasion, the Court concluded that the Rules Enabling Act covered
evidence law,24 5 adopted evidence rules for use in federal courts, 2" and
transmitted them for congressional review as required by the Act, although
one of its members dissented on the ground that "fashioning rules of
evidence is a task for the legislature, not for the judiciary"247
Congress's reaction to the court-adopted rules was unfriendly to say the
least. Over a two-year period, it conducted hearings on the content of the
rules and the authority of lawmakers to create them,2" heard prominent

evidence and that the committee had no intention of writing evidence rules. See
William D. Mitchell,Attitude ofAdvisory Committee-Events LeadingtoProposal
for Uniform Rules-Problems on Which Discussionis Invited, 22 A.B.A. J. 780,
782 (1936). Professor Burbank said that commentators were closely divided over
whether the Act authorized the adoption of rules of evidence. See Burbank, supra
note 73, at 1140.
2 The Civil Rules included a provision on evidence that was designed to leave
the law alone and intact, described as follows by the official reporter of the
Advisory Committee:
[Tihe basic rule of evidence then adopted, Federal Rule 43(a), was
essentially of a holding nature, as it was so designed.
Essentially, the
rule provides that evidence admissible either under state procedure or under
former federal principles in either law or equity should be adnussible under
the presently revised procedure; in other words, that the rule of fullest
admissibility should everywhere prevail.
Charles E. Clark, A Symposium on the Uniform Rules ofEvidence: Forward,10
RUTGERS L. REv 479,482 (1956).
Some saw the inclusion of any provision on evidence as a sign that rulemaking
powers included evidence law. See, e.g., Morgan, supranote 242, at 468. Others
believed that the Court violated the Enabling Act by including any provisions on
evidence law. See, e.g., Burbank,supra note 73, at 1142.
245 The Court appointed a committee to study the question of whether rules of
evidence were included within "practice and procedure" and was told by this
committee that "[t]he rules of evidence are for the most part procedural and within
the rule-making power." Thomas F Green, Jr., A PreliminaryReport on the
Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the
United States District Courts,30 F.R.D. 73, 114 (1961).
246 See Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates,
56 F.R.D. 183 (1973) [hereinafter Proposed Rules].
247 Id. at 185 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
24S See Rules of Evidence: HearingsBefore the Special Subcomm. on Reform
ofFederalCriminalLaws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong. 73

1999-2000]

KENTUCKY RULES OF EVIDENCE

commentators again differ over whether the law of evidence is substance
or procedure, 249 and at the end of the day enacted the Federal Rules of
Evidence into law as statutes. 0 Few believe that these events did much to
settle the question of whether evidence law constitutes substance or
procedure,"5 ' although they gave us a "model" for evidence law reform that
clearly exists as statutes rather than as rules of court.
Most who have studied the substance/procedure dichotomy m the
context of evidence law adhere to the view that "the great bulk of what we
presently know as the law of evidence is procedure,"2 52 which means of
course that they also adhere to the view that some part of this law is not
procedural. Most acknowledge that there is a shadowy area in the law
where procedure ends and substance begins (a "twilight zone") and that
"the distinction between substance and procedure is sometimes difficult to
discern." 3' Unfortunately, as Justice Rutledge reminded us more than fifty
years ago, "this fact cannot dispense with the necessity of making a
distinction."' This Article mquires as to how far the Kentucky General
Assembly can go on its own to amend the Rules of Evidence and has only
one way to conclude that mquiry The "substance" in this law must be

(1973).
249 For example, former Supreme Court Justice Goldberg
testified that the law
of evidence is more substantive than procedural and falls within the domain of the
legislature. See id. at 142-46 (testimony of Hon. Arthur J. Goldberg). On the other
hand, Judge Mans, who had been involved in the formulation of the rules, testified
that the lawyers, judges, and scholars who had worked on the rules "are fully
satisfied that rules ofevidence are basically procedural, and. within the rulemaking
power of the Court." Id. at 76 (statement of Albert B. Mans).
25oSee Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
25 Some have said, with good reason, that Congress's intervention simply rendered moot the question concerning the Supreme Court's rulemaking power. See
Burbank, supranote 73, at 1022; Earl C. Dudley, Jr., FederalismandFederalRule
ofEvidence 501. Privilege and Vertical Choice ofLaw, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1797
(1994). This is because Congress unquestionably possesses the authority to create
evidence law for federal courts whether classified as substance or procedure. See
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
2 Ronan Degnan, The FeasibilityofRules ofEvidence in FederalCourts, 24
F.R.D. 341, 345 (1959) (emphasis added). See also Giannelli, supranote 5, at 41
("The overwhelming number of commentators have concluded that most rules of
evidence are procedural.").
z Dudley, supra note 251, at 1797
5 Cohenv. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,559 (1949) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting).
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separated from the "procedure," a task that should begin with some
discussion of standards and guidelines for making the separation.
B. Standardsand Guidelines
One of the early writers on tis subject said that the law of evidence is
procedure if it "promote[s] the adequate, simple, prompt, and mexpensive
admiistration of justice" 5 and substance if it "is grounded upon a
declaration of general public policy "6 Professor Joiner added a measure
of clarity to this approach in expressing a similar viewpoint:
[S]o long as the purpose and effect of a rule of evidence is to regulate the
method ofproving cases, and there is no other policy as established by the
state involving matters other than the orderly dispatch ofjudicial business,
promulgation by court rule would be valid. It should thus be clear that
most of the rules of evidence fall m tins category. 57
The first of these observations has been faulted for understating the
complexity of the substance/procedure relationship in the law of
evidence 8 and the second for excluding too much of the law from the
procedure category 11 They enhance our understanding of that relationship
nonetheless, by reminding us that "accuracy in fact-finding is not the sole
rationale for the law of evidence" 26 and by making the crucial point that
evidence rules oftentimes "masquerade as rules affecting the manner of
proof even as they further other State policies. 26 1
In his more recent study of the issue, Professor Dudley placed the
substance/procedure boundary between rules "designed to affect conduct
outside the courtroom"262 and rules designed "to enhance the accuracy of
5 Riedl,
supranote 57, at 604.
z6 Id.
22587 Joiner, supra note 197, at 434.
The criticism is that it assumes that evidence rules fall neatly into one or the
other of these pigeon-holes. See Levm & Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 21.
2" The criticism is that many evidence rules have both substantive and procedural elements and that insistence upon procedural purity would unduly restrict
judicial rulemakmg authority. See id. at 23.
260 Dudley, supra note 251, at 1795.
261Margaret
A. Berger, Privileges,Presumptionsand Competency ofWitnesses
in FederalCourt:A FederalChoice-of-Laws Rule, 42 BROOK. L. REv 417, 419
(1976).
262 Dudley, supra note 251, at 1781.
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' An earlier analysis of the
the fact finding process."263
issue had produced
a similar approach with slightly more room on the substance side of the
boundary- "[A] rule is substantive in tins context
(a) if it has a
nonprocedural purpose, or (b) even if its purposes are entirely procedural,
if it is calculated to affect behavior at the planning as distinguished from
the disputative stage of activity "2
Some rules, perhaps even most, serve multiple purposes and for that
reason are difficult to classify under this or any other standard. "mlt is
usually possible to discern a dominant purpose [underlying such rules],"265
says Dudley, and it is their dominant purpose that should govern classification decisions:

Scholars have traditionally treated rules of evidence whose primary
objective is to enhance the accuracy of the fact-finding process as
fundamentally
procedural in character. By contrast, evidentiary rules
thatpredomnantlyserve other goals... have been viewed as substantive,
even though some of the goals they serve are directly related to the
2
litigation process. 66
One can easily conclude, as did Dudley, that the dominant purpose of a
substantial majority of the provisions of evidence codes "is the enhance'
ment of accuracy in fact-finding."267
It is good to know that the rules are
"mostly procedural," so long as one understands that among the many are
at least some that embody policies that are designed to accomplish
objectives that have nothing to do with the search for truth in litigation.
Indeed, some operate to impede accuracy in fact-finding.
C. "Mostly Procedural"
1. Introduction
Kentucky's Rules of Evidence are substantially similar to the Federal
Rules. It has been said, and is undoubtedly true, that the dominant purpose
of a majonty of the Federal Rules "is the enhancement of accuracy in fact-

2631 d. at

1797
Guy Welbor I, The FederalRules ofEvidence andthe Application
ofState Law in the FederalCourts, 55 TEX'.L. REV 371,404 (1977).
265 Dudley, supranote 251, at 1807
2
Id. at 1797 (emphasis added).
267 1d. at 1807
264 Olin
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It is safe to say, as we have so often been told,2 69 that the bulk

of our evidence rules are indeed procedural, fall within the exclusive
rulemaking authority of the Kentucky Supreme Court, and may not be
amended by independent action of the General Assembly
2. Hearsay
The rules on hearsay easily comprise the biggest and most significant
part of evidence law They guard the gate against unreliable proof and are
designed "to achieve a more effective and truthful result in the litigation
process. 270 They are not intended to affect conduct outside the courtroom

and entail no public policy that is extrinsic to fact-finding accuracy There
is a consensus among commentators that hearsay rules are "procedure"
rather than "substance"27 ' and consistent support for that position exists in
the case law,272 although litigation of the classification issue has not been
extensive. In Drumm v. Commonwealth,2 3 a statute creating a hearsay
exception for statements by child abuse victims was struck down as "an
unconstitutional exercise of judicial rule-making power by the General
Assembly,"274 a decision that makes it easy to conclude that K.R.E. 1102
gives the General Assembly no authority to act on its own to modify the
hearsay provisions of Rules 801 through 806.
3. Witnesses
The provisions of Article VI of Kentucky's Rules, under the heading
"witnesses," cover a range of subjects related to the production of
268

id.

269

See, e.g., Joiner, supra note 197, at 435; Giannelli, supra note 5, at 41,

Thomas F Green, Jr., DraftingUniform FederalRules ofEvidence, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 177, 206 (1967); Joiner & Miller, supra note 79, at 651, Jack B. Wemstem,
The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of FederalRules of
Evidence,
69 COLUM. L. REV 353, 361 (1969).
270Westein, supra note 269, at 361.
271 Harold Kom, ContinuingEffect ofState Rules of Evidence in the Federal
Courts,48 F.R.D. 65,73 (1969); Degnan, supranote 252, at 346; Riedl, supranote
57, at 605; Weinstein, supra note 269, at 362.
272 See, e.g., Ricciardi v Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 811 F.2d 18 (1st Cir.
1987); Croom v Fiedler, 341 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1965); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Schlatter, 203 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1953).
...
Dnmm v Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1990).
274
Id. at 382.
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testimomal evidence-testimomal qualifications, impeachment and
rehabilitation, cross-examination of witnesses, and others. They are
designed to ensure the production of minimally reliable evidence, to
facilitate judgments about the credibility of witnesses, and to promote an
orderly production of evidence through witnesses. There may be societal
objectives in a few of the rules that extend beyond the orderly dispatch of
judicial business but none that would be paramount over their obvious
pursuit of accuracy in the resolution of factual issues.275 Courts have
classified rules of this nature as 'procedure '276 and commentators have
concurred;277 Kentucky's case law is thin in the area but generally
supportive of fis conclusion. 278 The provisions of Article VI, Rules 601
through 615, are procedural in the purest sense, and it is hard to see any
basis for a conclusion that the General Assembly can act on its own to
amend them.
A potentially important classification issue that is affected by Rule 601
needs to be mentioned. It involves the so-called dead man's statutes which
operate to preclude survivors of events in litigation from testifying against
deceased participants in those events and is well-described in the following
statement:
The Dead Man's statute may
be viewed m a variety of ways.
It
may be placed in the category of a rule designed to better ascertain the
truth by discouraging perjury on the part of the survivor. But it may also
be viewed as a rule designed to protect the estate of the deceased by
279
placing obstacles in the way of claim prosecutions.

See, e.g., K.R.E. 610. Rule 610 prohibits the use of evidence of religious
beliefs to enhance or impair the credibility ofwitnesses. Considerations ofreligious
freedom and/or rights of privacy may have been a motivation for the adoption of
this rule but would have been less significant than considerations related to the
probative
value of such evidence and its potential for prejudice to litigants.
276 See,
e.g., Pastemak v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 417 F.2d 1292 (10th Cir.
1969); Poole v. Leone, 374 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1967); Erie R. Co. v. Lade, 209
F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1954).
277 See, e.g., Dudley, supra note 251, at 1807; Riedl, supra note 57, at 605;
Weinstein, supra note 269, at 362.
278The most significant case is probably Gainesv. Commonwealth, 728 S.W.2d
525 (Ky. 1987). At issue in this case was the constitutionality of a statute allowing
children to testify via videotape without findings by the judge and in the absence
of an oath. The statute, said the supreme court, "is a legislative interference with
the 279
orderly admnimstration ofjustice." Id. at 527
Weistem, supra note 269, at 365.
275
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Rules designed to promote the search for truth are procedure; rules
designed to protect the assets of estates are not. Some scholars have said
that dead man's statutes are substance,28 0 others have said that they are
procedure,28 ' while still others have put them in the "twilight zone."28 2
There was controversy over how to classify them for purposes of the
Federal Rules, and the resolution of that controversy made them look more
like substance than procedure.2 3 Kentucky had a dead man's statute that
was used for many decades without any question ever being raised as to
whether the General Assembly had authority to enact it into law 28 Its
repeal upon the adoption of the Evidence Rules28 5 rendered moot the
question of whether it must be viewed as substance or procedure, a
question that would have to be revisited should the General Assembly ever
undertake on its own to revive the statute.
4. Opinions
The rules on opinion testimony are contained in the provisions of
Article VII, Rules 701 through 706. Rule 701 seeks to ensure an accurate
reproduction of events by lay witnesses. Rule 702 is designed to facilitate
intelligent evaluation of facts, and the whole Article strives to shield
decision makers from unreliable evidence, objectives that caused Judge
Weinstein to describe these laws as "truth determining rules. '286 There are
no social policies extrinsic to accuracy in fact-finding embodied in the

210 See,

e.g., Riedl, supranote 57, at 604.
Giannelli, supra note 5, at 51; Thomas F Green, Jr., Highlights of
the ProposedFederalRules ofEvidence, 4 GA. L. REv 1, 13 (1969).
282 Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 22; Weinstein, supra note 269, at
365.283
The proposed rules that came to Congress from the Supreme Court abolished
dead man's statutes. There was hue and cry over tins position because it would
have foreclosed the applicability of state dead man's statutes m federal cases based
on diversity jurisdiction. The role of the substance/procedure distinction m
resolving choice-of-laws issues in such cases was discussed earlier; federal courts
must apply state "substance" but not state "procedure." Congress rejected the
Supreme Court proposal and adopted in its place Federal Rule 601, leaving room
for state dead man's statutes in diversity cases and suggesting that, at least for
purposes of the Ene Doctrine, such statutes belong m the category of substance.
284
See RoBERTG. LAWSON, THE KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK 35589 (2d
ed. 1984).
285 See Act of Apr. 9, 1992, ch. 324, § 30, 1992 Ky Acts 936.
286 Westein, supra note 269, at 361.
281See, e.g.,
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opinion rules and no reason to doubt that they must be classified as
'
"procedure" rather than "substance."287
Rule 1102 gives the General
Assembly no authority to act on its own to amend the provisions of Article
VII.
5. Others
Fact-finding accuracy is the predominant objective of the provisions
found in Article I, the general provisions; Article II, judicial notice; Article
IX, authentication and identification; and Article X, contents of writings,
recordings, and photographs. They are rules of "procedure" for purposes
of Rule 1102 and may not be amended by independent actions of the
General Assembly
D. Privileges
1. Introduction
The privileges rules are unique among evidence rules. It has been said
that "they cannot properly function as rules of 'mere' evidence,"2 8 and, of
course, it is obvious that they operate in contradiction to the basic thrusts
of the law "Privileges
do not aid m the efficient or accurate disposition
of lawsuits. Their rationale rests on a desire to protect and foster certain
interests and relationships which 'are regarded as of sufficient social
importance' to justify the deliberate suppression of helpful testimony 289
They serve purposes that are extrinsic to the litigation process and affect
private conduct outside the courtroom, both of which make them appear
substantive. But they clearly reserve their most important moments for the
courtroom and have their most significant effect upon the product of the
judicial process, making them look procedural. Are they to be classified as
"substance" or "procedure?" This is obviously the question of the moment,

Although it involves choice-of-laws decisions m federal diversity cases
rather than rulemakmg power decisions, the most recent case law on classification
easily puts the opinion rules in the procedure category. See, e.g., Fox v.
Dannenberg, 906 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1990); Salas v. Wang, 846 F.2d 897 (3d Cir.
1988); Dawsey v. Olin Corp., 782 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1986); Scott v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1986); Joy Mfg. Co. v Sola Basic Indus.,
Inc.,28697 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1982).
' Dudley, supra note 251, at 1813.
2 9Berger, supra note 261, at 421.
2
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made so by acts already taken by the General Assembly against the
privilege provisions of the Rules. It is a concrete rather than hypothetical
problem and is almost certain to draw the attention of the supreme court
sooner rather than later.
2. FederalRules
What to do with privileges provoked an intense fight during the federal
reform of evidence law Most of the case law predating adoption of the
Federal Rules had classified the law of privileges as "substantive" rather
than "procedural,""29 creating doubt concerning the authority of the
Supreme Court to promulgate privileges rules. Commentators were divided
over the issue,2 91 but the Advisory Committee that had been formed to
prepare and propose rules saw more "procedure" than "substance" in
privileges: "The appearance of privilege in the case is quite by accident,
and its effect is to block off the tribunal from a source of information. Thus
its real impact is on the method of proof in the case, and in comparison any
substantive aspect appears tenuous." 292 Believing that the authority question
had been settled byHannav. Plumer,293 the Committee recommended a full
set ofprivileges rules, and the Supreme Court included them m the package
that it adopted and transmitted to Congress for approval.294 The protest
aroused by these recommendations almost single-handedly led to rejection
of the Supreme Court's package and a substitution of statutes for court
rules in the reform of federal evidence law
290

See, e.g., Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.
1967); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463 (2d. Cir. 1962);
Palmer v Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955). Butsee Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach,
281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
29' See Degnan, supra note 252, at 346 ("Opimons of highly respectable
commentators have differed on this subject."); Green, supranote 281, at 10 ("It can
hardly be said that privileges
may not be rationally categorized as procedural;
in fact, ProfessorE.M. Morgan has suggested that they shouldbe so classified. That
opposing views exist merely indicates that either classification is rational.").
292 Proposed Rules, supranote 246, at 233.
293Hanna v Plumer,
380 U.S. 460 (1965). "Hannaconvinced many, including
the Advisory Committee that drafted the Rules ofEvidence, that all State privileges
might be eliminated. Others, however, continued to maintain throughout the
congressional debate on the Rules that a federal rule displacing a State privilege
would
violate the Enabling Act." Berger, supra note 261, at 430.
294 See Proposed
Rules, supra note 246, at 230-61.
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It would be somewhat of an understatement to say that critics were
unhappy with the content of the privileges proposals,2 95 but the loudest
objections clearly ran to the fact that privileges law was being formulated
under a rulemaking power extending only to matters involving "practice
and procedure," i.e., the orderly dispatch of judicial business. "The
strenuous objections to the Advisory Committee's treatment of privileges
focused primarily on the Committee's refusal to recogmze that such
rules reflect State interests that transcend considerations based on
'
increasing the accuracy and efficiency of judicial determinations."296
Congress's final action on the proposals was undoubtedly driven by
concerns over the reach of rulemaking authority It abandoned all of the
proposed privileges, required federal courts to apply state law on privileges
in diversity cases, and provided for the retention of common law principles
for use in other cases.297 These actions would clearly not have been taken
without a congressional conclusion that the law of privileges must be
classified as "substance" rather than "procedure."
Congress's conclusion that privileges law is substance rather than
procedure was drawn in this instance to resolve issues related to the
allocation of powers between state and federal governments. It may be
more pertinent to the discussion in this Article that the same conclusion
was later drawn in connection with an allocation of rulemaking power
between the judicial and legislative branches of government.2 9 Several
years after rejecting court-created rules of evidence law and enacting
evidence statutes, Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act and gave the
Supreme Court explicit authority to prescribe rules of evidence.219 In so
doing, however, it retained exclusive control over a single area of evidence
law by providing that "[a]ny such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying
an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by
The absence of a physician-patient privilege provoked doctors, the narrowness of ther privilege provoked the psychotherapists, the absence of a journalist
privilege provoked members of the press, and the absence of a privilege for
confidential
commniumcations between
296 Berger, supranote 261, at 439. spouses provoked almost everybody
297
See FED. R. EviD. 50 1.
298 This is not to suggestthat substance/procedure determinations for federalism
purposes offer no guidance on substance/procedure determinations for rulemaking
purposes. In fact, the opposite is probably true as the inquiry in both instances is
whether the law being classified involves the orderly dispatch of litigation or some
extrinsic policy that extends beyond concerns over the fact-finding accuracy of the
29

judicial
process.
299

See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1994).
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Act of Congress."3 °° It has been said, and is certainly accurate, that
"Congress singled out privileges for special treatment because it viewed
them as substantive."30'
3. Scholars
Classification of privileges rules has not produced consensus among
scholars, although everyone concedes that the most compelling case for
classifying evidence law as "substance" can be made with respect to the
area involving privileges. Some commentators look at the rules, focus on
their evidentiary impact, and see somewhat more procedure than
substance;0 2 others look at the same rules and see extrinsic social policies
that are substantially more significant than the procedural effect of such
rules.3 3 It is perhaps noteworthy that most of those in the first group
formed their views before the battle over classification of federal privileges
and the developments described in the preceding paragraphs.
Dudley says that privileges are designed to serve substantive objectives
and "concern conduct outside the immediate context of litigation." 3°
Berger says that they regulate conduct outside the courtroom in order to
foster "relationships which 'are regarded as of sufficient importance to
justify the deliberate suppression of helpful testimony "'305 In other words,
301Id. § 2074(b).
301 Giannelli, supranote 5, at 44.
312See,
e.g., Degnan, supranote 252, at 347 ("It must be said that even the
law of privilege is at least half-procedure, for a truth-seeking interest is being
weighed against atruth-obstructing interest. "); Morgan, supranote 242, at 484
("It follows that such a [rulemaking] provision should be interpreted as vesting m
the courts the power to make rules of evidence, including those governing
competency and privileges of witnesses and privileged communications.").
" See, e.g., Dudley, supranote 251, at 1813 ("Privilege rules are unique, and
in a sense they cannot properly function as rules of 'mere' evidence."); Thomas
Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Court: An Alternative to the
ProposedFederalRules ofEvidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 110 (1973).
These privileges rules
are designed to "affect people's conduct at the
stage of primary private activity" and therefore should be classified as
substantive or quasi-substantive and are "unlike the ordinary rules of
practice which refer to the processes of litigation, in that [they affect]
private conduct before the litigation arises."
Id. (quoting Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Brei, 311 F.2d 463,466 (2d Cir.
1962)).
3oDudley, supra
note 251, at 1802.
305Berger, supra note 261, at 421.

1999-2000]

KENTUCKY RULEs OF EVIDENCE

say these scholars and others, the privileges rules push beyond the orderly
dispatch of legal business and penetrate well into "areas of basic social and
moral policy,"3 °6 far enough to create a belief among many that decisions
concerning such policy should be left to forums that are closer to the public
than are courts:
[P]nvileges are too much a part of the social fabric to be the exclusive
preserve of professional expertise. True, they raise problems of legal
practice andjudicial administration, but also philosophical, psychological
and, m the fine sense of the word, political, problems wich m a
democratic society must at least m the first instance be fought out m

legislative halls

307

A clergyman's privilege exists because of deeply embedded feelings that
humans need inmate religious counseling and advice; spousal privileges
promote intimacy in marriage relationships and express a "'natural
repugnance' for convicting a defendant upon the testimony of his or her
'intimate life partner.'"308 It is very difficult to argue that these are
decisions that ought to be rendered by public servants who are elected to
facilitate the search for truth in the courtroom.
4. Conclusion
The word "bad" belongs in any evaluative judgment of what the
General Assembly has done to the privileges provisions of the Evidence
Rules. No privilege is ever warranted unless the injury that would result
from requiring testimony would be greater than the damage to the judicial
process from the loss of inportant Information. s°9 Probably none of the
privileges added to the Rules by the General Assembly could survive
careful scrutiny under this standard.31 0 This, however, is completely beside
the poit, for this inquiry examines the authority of the General Assembly
to act and not the wisdom of its actions.
3"

Degnan, supranote 252, at 347
David W Louisell & Byron M. Cnppm, Jr., Evidentiary Privileges, 40
MiNN.
L. REV 413,414 (1956).
308Giannelli, supranote 5, at 52-53 (footnote omitted).
309 See JoHN WiGMORE, EvIDENCE AT TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 527 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
3 It has been said and is true that most privileges "exist principally because of
the activities of pressure groups." Green, supra note 281, at 16. It is almost a
certainty that the ones under discussion owe their existence solely to the interests
of those who obtained the privileges.
307
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The General Assembly has exercised authority over privileges rules for
at least several decades. The statutes on the books when Kentucky
undertook to reform its evidence law included provisions on spousal
privileges3 11 the attorney-client privilege, M religious pnvilege,313 the
psycluatrist-patient privilege, 14 and some lesser known privileges.3 5 No
doubt was ever expressed before their repeal concerning their legitimacy,
although the supreme court had much earlier laid claim to exclusive
authority over matters of "practice and procedure." It might be quite a
stretch to conclude from these circumstances that the court has conceded
that privileges rules are substance rather than procedure. It is not insignificant, however, that the court has had hundreds of opportunities to claim
exclusive authority over privileges and has never made even a slight
movement in that direction.
In separating evidence law into substance and procedure, the best
scholars draw a distinction between rules that predominantly foster
accuracy in fact-finding and rules that predominantly foster other objectives. They classify the latter as substantive and place privileges in that
category It is interesting, in light of these conclusions, to revisit the
supreme court's only opimon on this subject since the adoption of the
Evidence Rules. The issue in Mullins v. Commonwealth,"' as more fully
discussed above, was whether the legislature had intruded upon the
rulemaking powers ofthe court by enacting a statute that removed from the
protection of the spousal privileges provision of the Rules testimony about
child sexual abuse. In sustaining the validity of the statute, the court
seemed to recogmze a most substantial role for the General Assembly in
the definition of evidentiary privileges: "The General Assembly may
legislate in order to protect children, and it may determine that children's
rights are paramount when there is a conflict with the privilege of an adult
to exclude evidence regarding the abuse, dependency or neglect of a
child."317 The court does not say in so many words where privileges belong
in the substance/procedure dichotomy, but its decision and observations
seem to chart a course toward the position that is described in the first part
of this paragraph. Should it get to that destination, the court would
See K.R.S. § 421.210(1) (repealed 1992).
id. § 421.210(4).
313 See id.
314 See id. § 421.215 (repealed 1992).
315
See, e.g., id. § 421.2151 (sexual assault counselor privilege); id. § 421.216
(school
counselor-student privilege) (repealed 1992).
31 6
Mullins v Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1997).
317
Id. at 212.
311

3 2 See
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conclude that the provisions m Article V, Rules 501 through 511, may be
amended by independent actions of the General Assembly
E. Relevancy andRelatedSubjects
1. Introduction
No one would contend that the fundamental rules of relevancy are
anything but pure procedure. There is no purpose other than fact-finding
accuracy in the relevancy requirement, the definition of relevant evidence,
and the provision authorizing the exclusion of such evidence when it
threatens the reliability of judicial decisions. 18 The rules on character,
including provisions on other crimes, wrongs, or acts, are designed to
address recurring relevancy problems, promote no purposes other than
accuracy in the judicial process, and should be treated as "practice and
procedure" for purposes of Rule 1102. Beyond these provisions of Article
IV, Rules 401 through 405, rests the area of evidence law that is the second
most likely, behind the law of privileges, to harbor rules of substance.
2. SubsequentRemedial Measures
Rule 407, which prohibits the use of subsequent remedial measures to
prove that an injury-causing act was negligent, is one of several provisions
in Article IV that serves multiple purposes. It seeks to promote fact-finding
accuracy by excluding evidence thought to have low probative value and
high potential for prejudice, seeks to avert injury and harm to others by
encouraging corrective measures, and thus is both procedural and
substantive. 19 It is unsurprising that this classification has produced
disagreement and conflicting decisions.
Rule 402 imposes the relevancy requirement, Rule 401 defines relevant
evidence, and Rule 403 authorizes exclusion to protect the reliability ofthe process
from prejudice, confusion, waste of time, etc. The first two are patently procedural
and the third is close: "[Miost discretionary exclusions under the doctrine
embodied in rule 403 are based upon what Wigmore called auxiliary probative
policy. The purpose of the exclusion is to ensure more accurate factfinding, not to
promote some extrinsic policy
Therefore, such rulings are normally
classifiable as procedural for all purposes." Wellborn, supra note 264, at 394-95.
319 Of the purposes underlying Rule 407, the concern that the evidence
may be irrelevant, highly prejudicial, or confusing can be considered
procedural because it deals with fairness in the litigation process.
The
other purpose of Rule 407 is to promote the social policy of fostering
repairs. This reflects a policy choice extrinsic to the lawsuit.
LevDassm,DesignDefectsin theRulesEnablingAct:The MisapplicationofFederal
Rule ofEvidence 407 to StrictLiability,65 N.Y.U. L. REV 736,778 (1990).
318
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The classification issue has surfaced most often as a choice-of-laws
question in federal diversity cases. Should the provision be viewed as
procedure, allowing federal law to apply, or should it be viewed as
substance, requiring the use of state law 9 Everyone puts the provision in
the "borderland where procedure and substance are mterwoven 3 20 and
finds classification difficult. A majority of the federal courts which have
considered the question see the rule as sufficiently based on procedural
considerations to be classified as procedure,3 2' while a strong minority
believes that the provision is too substantive to be classified as
procedure.3 Commentators are far more consistent in their views than the
federal courts and seem almost umversally to see the provision "as part of
the fabric of substantive law "323
K.R.E. 407 is borrowed from the Federal Rules. Drafters of those Rules
spoke very clearly about the paramount purpose for excluding evidence of
subsequent remedial measures:
320

Flamno v Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463,471 (7th Cir. 1984).
See, e.g., Woody. Morbark Indus., 70 F.3d 1201 (1 lth Cir. 1995); Cameron
v Otto Bock Orthopedic Indus., 43 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1994); Kelly v Crown Equip.
Co., 970 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1992).
[T]he substantive judgment that underlies Rule 407 is entwined with
procedural considerations. Itis only because juries arebelievedto overreact
to evidence of subsequent remedial measures that the admissibility of such
evidence could deter defendants from taking such measures. Congress's
judgment thatjunes are apt to give too much weight to such evidence is a
procedural judgment
that is, a judgment concerning procedures
designed to enhance accuracy or reduce expense in the adjudicative process.
Flamino, 733 F.2d at 471 (citation omitted).
322 See, e.g.,
Wheelerv. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1988); Oberst
v. International Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1980). "The purpose of Rule
407 is not to seek the truth or to expedite trial proceedings; rather, in our view, it
is one designed to promote state policy in a substantive law area." Moe v. Avions
Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d917, 932 (10th Cir.), cert.denied,469
U.S. 853 (1984).
323 2 CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 73
(2d ed. 1994). See also Dassm, supra note 319, at 738-39 ("Since Rule 407's
primary purpose is to encourage safety Improvements by defendants, the Rule
affects social behavior extrinsic to lawsuits. Therefore, Rule 407 should be
characterized as substantive
"); Weinstein, supranote 269, at 370 ("The third
category of evidence rules includes those designed to achieve independent
substantive impact.
In many instances the extrinsic policy has been tagged as
a rule of relevance, as in the case of exclusion of post-accident repairs offered
to show negligence.") (footnote omitted).
321

1999-2000]

KENTUCKY RuLEs oF EviDENCE

The rule rests on two grounds. (1)The conduct is not in fact an admission,
since the conduct is equally consistent with injury by mere accident or

(2) The other, andmore impressive,
through contributory negligence.
ground for exclusion rests on a social policy of encouraging people to
take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance

of added safety.3 24
The "more npressive" ground for the provision, its "paramount purpose,"
is a nonprocedural purpose. If "paramount purpose" is to be the keystone
in classifying rules that intermingle substance and procedure, as it must be,
then there can be no real doubt about the proper classification of Rule 407
It should be classified as "substance" for purposes of Rule 1102, which
would mean that it is subject to amendment by independent actions of the
General Assembly
3. Offers of Compromise
Rule 408 is another provision that is designed to serve multiple
purposes. It promotes accuracy in fact-finding by excluding evidence that
is often weak in probative value and always burdened with a great potential
for prejudice. It has been said, however, that "[a] more consistently
impressive ground [for the provision] is promotion of the public policy
favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes."3 ' Because Rule 408
acts as a kind of privilege for commumcations made during settlement
negotiations and is calculated to encourage conduct outside the courtroom,
it has the characteristics of substantive law It has been identified by
commentators as a rule that might be classified as substance but has drawn
no firm commitment to that position,32 6 probably because it involves a
matter that is fundamental to the quality of justice in the courtroom. The
thin case law that can be found on the issue suggests that courts are likely
to classify the rule as procedure.327 Is the judiciary or the legislature better
suited for decision making on this subject? It is believed that the answer to
this crucial inquiry is obvious and that the proper classification of Rule 408
is procedure rather than substance.
FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (emphasis added). See also
STUDY COMM., supranote 6, at 30 ("As stated by the drafters of the Federal Rules,
this second ground for excluding the evidence is 'more inpressive."').
" FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
326
See, e.g., Korn, supranote 271, at 74-75; Dudley, supranote 251, at 1800;
Giannelli,
supra note 5, at 55-57
327 See Moms v. LTV Corp., 725 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1984).
324
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4. Rape Shield
Rule 412, the so-called rape shield law, serves primarily to limit
evidence of the sexual predisposition and prior sexual conduct of alleged
victims of sexual assault. The prototype for rape shield laws, wich exist
in most if not all jurisdictions, first appeared on the scene m order to alter
common law rules that authorized the use of evidence of an alleged rape
victim's moral character. Whether the aim was to eliminate the use of
irrelevant evidence or to protect the privacy interests of rape victims was
at least somewhat unclear, although the best bet might be that it was a
blend of the two.
Rule 412 is patterned after an earlier version of Federal Rule 412. The
history of the provision strongly indicates that its main objective was
nonprocedural---"to prevent the victim, rather than the defendant, from
being put on trial. ' 328 Most authorities on the Federal Rules would concur
with the following description of its goals:
Rule 412 arms to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of
privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of
sexual innuendo into the factfinding process. By affording victims
protection m most instances, the rule is designed to encourage victims of
sexual misconduct to institute and to participate in legal proceedings
32 9
against alleged offenders.
If there is a fact-finding purpose underlying the provision, it is surely
outweighed by the twin objectives of protecting privacy and encouraging
prosecution of offenders.
Kentucky had a rape shield statute before it had a rape shield provision
in the Evidence Rules. 330 The supreme court construed the statute on
several occasions without any expression of doubt about the authority of
the legislature to act in this area. The court of appeals spoke explicitly on
tis subject as well as on the purpose of the statute: "We believe the statute
is a valid exercise by the legislature of this Commonwealth to prevent
the victim in a sexually related crime from becoming the defendant at a

328 JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, WEiNsTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE

1999).

329 MICHAEL

1996).
331

H. GRAHAM,

412-19 (2d ed.

HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE

See K.R.S. § 510.145 (repealed 1992).

477 (4th ed.
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ral."33I It would be very hard for the supreme court to ignore this history
and claim exclusive control ofrape shield protection. The primary purposes
of the rule push into areas of social and moral policy and beyond the
technical expertise of the judiciary Rule 412 clearly belongs on the
substance side of the dichotomy
5. Others
Rule 409 excludes evidence of a defendant's payment of the plaintiff's
medical and similar expenses; it is designed to leave room for humanitarian
assistance to injured persons but is more heavily based on doubts about
relevance.332 Rule 411 excludes evidence of liability insurance when
offered to prove negligence or other wrongful conduct. It eliminates what
might be a disincentive to the acquisition of insurance coverage but is more
clearly based on concerns about probative value and prejudice. Rule 410
excludes evidence of plea bargaining and plea agreements and is based on
the same considerations that underlie Rule 408's exclusion of offers of
compromise. The supreme court is unlikely to find the extrinsic policies
fostered by these provisions to be superior to considerations related to
accuracy in fact-finding and is unlikely to permit the General Assembly to
amend them under the authority of Rule 1102.
F

Presumptions

Presumptions are burden of proof rules that have nothing to do with the
admission or exclusion of evidence. Some serve primarily, if not exclusively, to facilitate the search for truth and look mostly "procedural;"33' 3
others are closely connected to substantive rights and clearly look more
"substantive."33 4 Federal courts have usually classified presumptions as
"substance" for Ene Railroadpurposes, requiring the application of state

Smith v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
See Fields v. Rutledge, 284 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1955).
333
An example of a presumption that serves no purpose other than accuracy m
fact-finding is the presumption that a properly addressed and mailed letter was
received m due course by the addressee.
13 The presumption against suicide that operates to favor beneficiaries over
insurers is an example of a presumption that pursues policies other than factfinding accuracy, namely favoring one potential litigant over another by imposing
the burden of proof on the latter.
331
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presumptions law in diversity cases; 335 the Federal Rules of Evidence adopt
this same position.336 Commentators have been more discriminating m
classifying presumptions, although clearly recognizing that some if not
37
most belong on the substantive side of the distinction.
There are only two provisions on presumptions m the Kentucky Rules
of Evidence. Rule 301 provides that presumptions operate in civil cases to
shift the burden of going forward with evidence but not the risk of
nonpersuasion ("when not otherwise provided for by statute"). Rule 302
provides that presumptions related to facts governed by the law of other
jurisdictions shall be governed by the presumptions law ofthatjurisdiction.
The first blends procedure and substance, regulating the effects of
presumptions at tinal but authorizing the General Assembly to provide for
different effects by statute; it acknowledges the substantive nature of
presumptions law and would seem clearly to qualify as a rule that is subject
to legislative modification under Rule 1102. Rule 302 is a choice-of-laws
provision that belongs on the substance side of the dichotomy and that is
clearly subject to change by independent action of the General Assembly
V

CONCLUSION

The drafters of Kentucky's Evidence Rules sought to facilitate
amendment of the Rules through cooperative efforts of the supreme court
and General Assembly, similar to the efforts that had produced enactment
of the Rules in the first place. The plan was to reduce the importance of the
boundary separatingjudicial and legislative authority over evidence law by
giving the supreme court authority to initiate modification of the Rules and
the General Assembly an adequate opportunity to review modifications
implicating compelling matters of public policy They found a model for
the plan in the provisions that presently govern amendment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.338
In Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959), the leading
authority, the Supreme Court said that "[u]nder the Erie rule, presumptions (and
their effects) and burden of proof are 'substantive' "Id. at 446. The Court had
earlier classified burden ofproofrules as substantive forpurposes ofErieRailroad.
See, e.g., Palmer v Hoffinan, 318 U.S. 109, reh'gdenied, 318 U.S. 800 (1943);
Cities Serv. Oil Co. Vr Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
336
See FED. R. EVID. 302.
311 See, e.g., Ronan Degnan, The Law ofFederalEvidence Reform, 76 HARV
L. REV 275, 283 (1962); Ely, supra note 151, at 723; Levm & Amsterdam, supra
note 74, at 18; Weinstein, supra note 269, at 363-64.
...
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1994).
331
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Rule 1102 allocates to the supreme court a lion's share of the responsibility for amendment of the Rules by authorizing the court to prescribe
amendments to any provisions of the Rules (even those that might be
classified as substance rather than procedure). It requires that amendments
be transmitted to the General Assembly for review but authorizes the
General Assembly to reject and/or modify them only when they extend
beyond the court's constitutional power over practice and procedure. It was
expected that experiences with this approach would parallel those of the
federal system, with the General Assembly having very little interest in
modification of the Rules, routinely deferring to the judgment of the court,
and rarely taking actions to generate issues over whether the authority to
act should rest with the court or General Assembly Unfortunately, the
amendment process has not functioned as anticipated, and we have no way
of knowing if it would or would not have worked as planned.
The problem, simply described, is that the supreme court has shown no
interest in the Evidence Rules since their 1992 enactment. It has prescribed
no amendments under the provisions of Rule 1102 and has done nothing to
suggest that it might do so at some future point, although amendments are
currently needed. More tellingly, the court has failed to activate a
component of the amendment process that is crucial to its success-the
Evidence Rules Review Commission that was specifically created to work
with the supreme court and General Assembly on necessary modifications
of the Rules.339
The Evidence Rules Review Commission was designed to replicate
federal rules advisory committees that have worked effectively in gtuding
the United States Supreme Court through necessary reform of federal court
rules. It includes members from both the legislative and judicial branches
but was deliberately designed to be closer to the court than to the General
Assembly; 34 the chief justice serves as chair, appoints six of its eight
members, and holds exclusive authority to call the Commission for
meetings. It-was expected to monitor the operation of the Rules, participate
in amendment activities in both the court and General Assembly, and stand
as a barrier to modifications that would weaken the Rules. In fact, it has
done nothing. It did not exist at all for the first five years after enactment

" Rule 1103 defines the composition of the Commission and its role, and Rule
1102 ties the work of the Commission to the amendment process.
...It has two members from the judiciary (including the chief justice), two

members from the General Assembly (the chairs of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees), and five members from the practicing bar. See K..E.
1103(a).
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of the Rules, awaiting the chief justice's appointment of members,3 4' and
has yet to hold its inaugural meeting, which can only be called by the chief
justice.
One of the lessons of rulemaking history is that courts may be slow to
exercise rulemaking powers, even when the need to do so is obvious to all.
Another of the lessons of this history is that legislatures will quickly move
into rulemaking vacuums left by thejudiciary What we have seen since the
enactment of the Evidence Rules is a repeat of this history The supreme
court has been slow to exercise its responsibilities under Rules 1102 and
1103, and the General Assembly has moved aggressively against what it
apparently believes to be deficiencies in the Rules. Why the court has
shown so little interest in the Rules since their enactment is unclear if not
mysterious, since the Rules were far more the work of the court than the
General Assembly What it has done by manifesting such indifference to
the Rules is quite consequential.
Without participation by the supreme court, amendment of the Rules
must adhere to the constitutional separation of judicial and legislative
authority over evidence law Even under the very best of circumstances,
"[i]t must be recognized that there are areas in which it is not clear whether
the legislature or the judiciary should establish the necessary rules. 342 The
boundary that divides tis authority is profoundly blurred by a murky
mixture of policy and procedural considerations in evidence rules, and by
decades, maybe even centuries, of shared responsibility for the formulation
of the law Drafters hoped to maneuver around this condition by forging a
working partnership between the supreme court and General Assembly, a
hope crushed by the court's failure to perform critical obligations under
Rule 1103. It has put the Evidence Rules Review Commission out of
commission and will surely inherit from these actions difficult litigation
over whether the General Assembly has acted beyond its authority m
amending the Rules.
In addition to this development, of course, there is the damage that has
been inflicted upon the Rules by acts of the General Assembly-the
addition of totally unwarranted privileges that lie in wait for an opportunity
to impair the search for truth in an nportant case. There is less reason for
worry about this damage, which is slight, than about the weaknesses of the
amendment process that permitted it to occur. The General Assembly acted

3"See Letter from Robert F Stephens, Chief Justice, to Robert G. Lawson
(Apr. 3, 1997) (on file with author).
342 Joiner & Miller, supranote 79, at 629.
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in these instances without hearing a word from the judiciary about the
deleterious effects of these privileges upon the search for truth in litigation.
Drafters of the Rules believed it important for the General Assembly to
hear from the court before acting on evidence issues, and they structured
an amendment process to enable the Evidence Rules Review Commission
to accomplish this objective. The court has not taken the actions needed to
give the process a fair test. Unless that happens, it is highly probable that
the General Assembly will move well beyond the privileges area and pose
a far greater threat to the integrity and efficiency of the Rules than we have
seen so far.

